Supplementary Materials

for

Can Corruption Connect You to Politics? Nepotism, Anxiety, and Government Blame

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South Korea in Perspective

1) Comparison with OECD Countries: Corruption and Government Responsibility

Figures S1-S2 illustrate the public perception of corruption and the role of government among the South Korean public in comparison to other OECD countries featured in the World Values Survey Wave 7 (Haerpfer et al., 2022). The public perceptions of the relative responsibility of the government compared to self and the prevalence of corruption among South Koreans tend towards the average among OECD countries. This implies that among these OECD countries, South Korea is a typical case, not an outlier, in terms of how the public assesses the government's role and corruption.

Figure S1



Public perception of the responsibility of government versus individual

Note: Q108 of the World Values Survey: "Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement [The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for]; 10 means you agree completely with the statement [People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves]; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between."





Note: Q112 of the World Values Survey: "Now I'd like you to tell me your views on corruption – when people pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favor to other people in order to get the things they need done or the services they need. How would you place your views on corruption in [your country] on a 10-point scale where "1" means "there is no corruption in [my country]" and "10" means "there is abundant corruption in [my country]." If your views are somewhat mixed, choose the appropriate number in between."

2) Personal-level Corruption Experiences

Table S1 shows that corruption at the personal level is very rare among South Koreans. More than nine out of ten South Koreans were never involved in each type of personal-level corruption. According to Figure S3, more than 75% of South Koreans have never experienced any personal-level corruption in their lifetime. These results imply corruption is likely to be conceived as elite-level phenomena among South Koreans, different from some other countries, such as Brazil or India, where personal-level corruption is more rampant (Pande, 2007).

Table S1

oportion of having personal teref corruption experiences		
Types of personal bribery	% (No)	
I was personally asked for bribes by police.	94.4	
I was personally asked for bribes by government officer (bureaucrat).	93.8	
I was asked for bribes at work.	92.6	
I was asked for bribes at school.	88.1	
I was asked for bribes at hospital.	98.0	

Proportion of having personal-level corruption experiences

Note. Percent of "No" responses to the question "Have you ever experienced the following in your life?" (Yes/No).

Figure S3

Distribution of the number of personal-level corruption experiences



Prior Research on Corruption: Corruption Type and Political Outcome

Table S2

Corruption Type Authors Outcome Agerberg (2020) Bribery and Embezzlement Candidate preference Alexander et al. (2020) General Vote intention Anduiza et al. (2013) Nepotism Perceived severity Ares & Hernández (2017) Embezzlement Trust in politicians Vote choice Boas et al. (2019) Embezzlement Burhan et al. (2020) Perception of fairness Nepotism Charron & Bågenholm (2016) General Vote choice Chong et al. (2015) Embezzlement Voter turnout Dahlberg & Solevid (2016) Voter turnout General Ecker et al. (2016) General Vote intention Fernández-Vázquez (2016) Incumbent vote share Bribery Embezzlement Ferraz & Finan (2011) Embezzlement General Gini coefficient Gupta et al. (2002) Incerti (2020) Vote intention General Klašnja (2017) General Support for incumbents Klašnja & Tucker (2013) Bribery Vote intention Klašnja et al. (2021) Candidate preference Bribery Peters & Welch (1980) General Reelection Tavits (2008) General Subjective well-being Subjective well-being Tay et al. (2014) General Weitz-Shapiro & Winters (2017) Bribery Vote intention Winters & Weitz-Shapiro (2013) Bribery Vote intention Wu & Zhu (2016) Bribery Happiness You & Khagram (2005) General Corruption perception

Summary of selected existing research on corruption

Note. "General" refers either to public perceptions around "corruption" or observational data that conflates many different types of corruption scandals.

Analysis of Open-ended Responses of Personal Concerns

1) Methods

Participants were asked to describe their personal concerns in three topic areas: education, employment and retirement/ageing. Most respondents provided open-ended responses, although some included responses that indicate no concern. Our procedure for analyzing the open-ended responses included the following. First, we translated a sample of 455 responses to English because, NVivo, a software for qualitative text analysis, cannot analyze Korean characters effectively. Second, to identify the key themes, we read through all responses twice to note potential key themes and used NVivo to generate word clouds for each categories. We then hand-coded the responses using the themes identified.

When compiling examples, we examined the full sample but excluded responses that were blank or indicative of no concerns.¹ The rate of blank and no concern responses is included in the main text for each category. To analyze the rate of respondents that did not report any concerns, we returned to the full sample and filtered the responses in excel to include the responses that indicate no concerns or were blank. The average length of all responses, including blank responses and no concern responses, was 20.3 Korean characters. Retirement had the highest average response length (21.1 characters), followed by employment (21.0 characters), and education (18.63 characters).

2) Word Clouds of Frequent Words

The following word clouds, generated using NVivo, show the words that were frequently mentioned in the open-ended descriptions of personal concerns on education, employment, and retirement respectively.

Figure S4

Word clouds of frequent words in open-ended responses about personal concerns by topic



3) Examples of Open-Ended Responses by Themes

Tables S2-S4 show examples of open-ended responses for various themes identified for each area of concern. To create the list of open-ended responses that represent each theme, we initially used a random number generator to pull responses from the entire list (included both translated and non-translated responses) of respondent's unique IDs (n=1,186). These randomly chosen original responses were translated into English and included in these tables. In order to include a variety of substantive responses, we also manually read the original open-ended responses to supplement the list with additional responses that best characterized the variety of concerns for that category.

¹ Responses that were treated as blank or "no concern" include either blank responses or a range of variations of the following: "없어요," "없음," "해당없음," "없다" (None); "그닥 없음," "특별히 없다," "딱히 없음" (Not especially); "걱정거리가 없음," "걱정거리가 없다," "큰 걱정거리는 없다," "걱정거리가 별로 없다," "거의 걱정이 없다" (I have no worries), etc.

Theme	ID	Korean (original)	English (translated)
Education costs and	55	부담되는 사교육비 비싼 등록금	Heavy costs of private education and expensive tuition
competition	138	사교육 심화와 자녀의 대학 입시에 대한 걱정	Worried about the increasing need for private education and my children's college admissions
	224	아이가 없어서 걱정거리가 현재는 없는 편이나, 현재의 유치원 사태나 대학입시 같은 문제가 향후에도 지속될지 걱정임	Because I don't have children, I don't have much to worry about at the moment, but I'm worried whether the current kindergarten crisis and college admission problems would continue in the future.
	388 유치원 대란으로 인해 피해보고 있 아이들과 직장맘으로서 아이를 맡겨야하는데 유치원과 민간어린이집이 너무 적어 걱정이 가장 큽니다.		I am worried about kids who are disadvantaged due to the lack of kindergarten. As a working mother who must send my children to daycare, I am most worried about the lack of kindergarten and private daycare.
	616	너무 경쟁적이고 사교육이 심하다 공교육 위주의 교육이 필요 하다	It is too competitive and there is too much private education. We need to focus more on public education.
	953	자녀교육문제로 대학진로 문제로 걱정	I am worried about my children's education and which universities they would attend
	1079	교육비는 많이 들고 아이들도 공부하느라 고생하는데 대학 들어가기는 점점 힘들고 걱정이 많다	It costs a lot of money for my children's education, and my kids are struggling with learning, yet it's getting even more difficult to get into college, so I am worried a lot.
Additional educational needs	389	적성에 맞고 취업걱정없는 학과를 선택하기를 바라지만 조율하기 힘듦	I want to choose a major that suits my aptitude and ensures me a job, but it is hard to reconcile the two
	397	학교교육과 사회생활은 별개로 취업공부를 다시 해야하는 실정이 안타깝고 비현실적이다	It is very concerning and unrealistic that I need to additionally study for job seeking, separate from school education and building career.
	908	급변하는 시대에 맞춰서 다양한 추가교육을 받아야 하지 않을까 하는 걱정	I worry if I need to get additional education to keep up with the rapidly changing environments
	909	대학원 진학을 고려해야 하는지에 관한 고민	I am concerned whether I should consider studying for a graduate degree
	970	자격증및 영어등으로 고민을하고있다	I am concerned about getting more licenses and my English ability
	998	교육을 조금 더 받고 싶은데, 형편상 그렇지 못해 아쉽습니다	I wish to get more education, but I regret that I cannot due to personal circumstances

Open-ended responses by themes: Education

Unequal opportunities	821	평생 교육으로서 근처에서 마땅히 배울게 없고 비용 또한 비싸다.	There are not many things to learn for lifelong education around me and they cost a lot of money.
	916	경제적 불균형이 교육 혜택의 불균형으로 이어지고 있다. 과연 아이를 낳아 차별없이 올바르게 교육할 수 있을지 걱정이다.	Economic inequalities are resulting in unequal opportunities in educational benefits. I am worried if I can properly educate my future child without discrimination.
	1052	지방의 교육프로그램 부족 및 수준미달	Lack of education programs and the low quality of those programs in the regions outside Seoul

Theme	ID	Korean (original)English (translated)			
Threat of unemployment	599	취업해서 일해야 하는데 요즘 일자리가 많이 없는편이다. 만약 지금 다니는 직장에서 퇴사하면 다시 일자리를 구할수 있을지. 급여는 만족하게 받을수 있을지가 걱정입니다.	I need to get a job, but there are not many jobs these days. I am worried whether I'd be able to get a new job after quitting my current job and whether I'd be able to have satisfactory income.		
	637	경력단절로 인한 재취업	Getting a new job after career interruption		
	933	경제가 안좋아서 직장에서 해고당하거나 그 밖에 불이익 등	Whether my company would fire me or impose any disadvantages due to the bad economy		
Unstable employment for at-will limited- term employees	108	계약직의 고용불안. 결혼 후 구직활동	Anxiety about stable employment because I'm a contract worker. Also worried about job seeking after getting married.		
	368	정규직의 자리는 점점 줄어가고, 계약직으로 돌리고 돌리는 자리에 있다가 정규직으로 변경 되는건 하늘에 별따기인 요즘 취업비리도 너무 많고 일하고 싶어도 계약직이라는 굴레에서 벗어나기가 정말 힘들다고 생각합니다. 거기에 여성으로서 출산과 육아에 치이다 보면 자기 개발을 할 시간은 꿈꾸기도 어렵습니다.	There are fewer and fewer regular/permanent jobs, I've been at a position that continuously rotated being a contract worker, so it's extremely rare to get a regular position these days. Also there is so much corruption about employment, so it is very difficult to be released from the fate of being an at-will limited term employee. Moreover, as a female worker, I am bound by childbirth and childcare, so it is beyond my dream to find time for self- development.		
Decreasing retirement age, Mid-age job seeking	648	남은 수명에 비해 수입이 언제까지 일정하게 들어올수 있는지가 걱정이다	I am worried about how long I will be able to have consistent income throughout the rest of my life.		
	888	요즘 은퇴시기가 빨라지면서 언제 회사를 관둬야 할지 모른다는 불안감.	Anxiety about the possibility that I might need resign my current job because the retirement		

	퇴사후 다른곳으로 취업이 가능할까하는 불안감. 늦게 아이를 낳은만큼 아이가 성인이 될때까지 고용유지가 될까하는 불안감.	age is decreasing these days. Worried whether I could get a new job after the resignation. I had my child late, so I am worried if I could have a stable job until my child becomes an adult.
923	명예퇴직 당하지 않을까 걱정된다	I worry that my company would force me to resign (<i>voluntary resignation</i>)
1007	60 세 이후 까지 계속 직업을 갖고 경제적으로 안정되게 살 수 있을지 염려가 된다	I am concerned whether I'll be able to have a job even after 60 and continue to live an economically stable life.

Open-ended responses by themes: Retirement

Theme	ID	Korean (original)	English (translated)
Lack of retirement funds & Increasing life expectancy	81	평균수명은 늘어가는 현실에은퇴후에 제대로 갖춰지지않은 노후자금이 고민이다	Given the increasing average life expectancy I am worried about the retirement funds that aren't completely ready for the years after my retirement.
	138	은퇴에 따른 노후 대책화 고령화로 인한 건강 문제 등	Making plans for my old age after retirement, health concerns due to aging, etc.
	911	은퇴 후 노후자금 부족 등을 겪지 않을까 걱정임	I am worried about experiencing the shortage of retirement funds after my retirement
	1247	저도 걱정이긴 하지만 부모님이 더 걱정하시고 계십니다곧 은퇴는 다가오는데 모아놓은 돈이 없어서 걱정이 많으십니다	I'm worried about myself too, but my parents are more worried Their retirement is coming soon, but they haven't accumulated much money, so they are very worried.
Insufficient national pension	384	물가는 너무높고 국민연금에 의존해서는 생활이 안되지않나 좋은자식 좋은부모가 되기위해 나의 은퇴후의 모습은 상상도 할수없다	Cost of living is too high and it wouldn't be feasible to afford living expenses only by relying on the national pension. To be a good child and good parent, I can't even imagine my life after retirement.
	508	국민연금 고갈 될거라는 불안감과 그다지개선되지 않는 생활수준 가파르게 오르는 물가 점점 벌어지는 빈부겨차로 인한 상대적인 박탈감으로 점점더 불안해지는 노령 시기이다	Anxiety that the national pension system will be depleted and the status of living that isn't getting better. I am getting even more worried in my old age due to the sense of relative deprivation coming from the steep inflation and increasing gap between the rich and the poor.
	1205	은퇴 후 필요한 생활자금이 많으며, 국민연금이 이를 뒷받침해 주기에는 만족스럽지는 못한 실정.	A lot of living expenses are required after retirement, but in reality the national pension system is not satisfactory enough

		고령화로 인해 내 자녀가 내야하는 세금걱정	to support the need. I am also worried about the tax that my children should pay due to the aging society
Cost of health care	382	은퇴 후 생활비에 대한 걱정과 고령화에 따른 생활비 및 의료비 지출 증가에 따른 부담	Anxiety about the cost of living after retirement and the burden of increasing living and medical expenses due to aging
	1085	본인과 배우자의 경우는 점점 나이가 들면서 나빠지는 건강문제와 더불어 은퇴후 노후생활의 안정여부문제, 노후 의료자금문제등이 가장 걱정거리이며, 부모님의 경우 노인 치매나 갑작스런 질병등으로 인한 입원 수술로 의료비와 간병문제가 가장 걱정이 된다	For myself and my spouse, I'm worried about the health that is getting worse as we get older and the stability of our life and health care costs after retirement. For our parents, I'm most concerned about health care costs and health care services that might incur due to dementia or surgery due to sudden illness.
Uncertainties about the life after retirement	1258	그동안 자식들을 키우면서 노후 준비가 미흡한 상태이다. 아직 젊은 나이지만, 곧 은퇴를 다가와서 이후의 계획을 제대로 생각하지 못했다.	While raising my kids, I haven't been able to prepare for my retirement. Although I'm still in my youth, retirement is coming up soon, so I haven't been able to think about my plan after then.
	1319	노후준비에 대해서 구체적으로 어떻게 설계해야할지, 건강하게 오래잘지낼수있을지 고민합니다.	I worry how I should concretely plan for my life after retirement, and how I could live a long, healthy life.

Experimental Design

1) Effects of Inequality Cue on Government Blame

We originally designed this study to be a 3 by 2 experimental design: the area of corruption (3 topics: college admission, preferential hiring, elderly care) and the explicitness of inequality (2 variations: explicit, implicit), in addition to control condition. We expected that framing corruption as a driver of inequality between elites and the public would increase government blame. When elite corruption highlighted its consequences of taking opportunities away from ordinary people, we considered this corruption case as having an *explicit inequality cue*. We manipulated this dimension of our experiment by either explicitly mentioning or not mentioning the consequence of corruption scandals. In the experimental design, participants were randomly assigned to either the *explicit* condition where the text included a sentence "In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected" or the *implicit* condition where the text did not include this sentence.

Content of experimental stimuli: Area of corruption and explicit inequality cue

Inequality cue	Implicit	Explicit		
College Admission	In October 2017, 10 congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in the admission process of universities . It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were admitted to prestigious universities without going through the appropriate process.	In October 2017, 10 congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in the admission process of universities . It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were admitted to prestigious universities without going through the appropriate process. In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.		
Preferential Hiring	In October 2017, 10 congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in the employment process of companies . It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were employed at large companies without going through the appropriate process.	In October 2017, 10 congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in the employment process of companies . It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were employed at large companies without going through the appropriate process. In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.		
Elderly Care	In October 2017, 10 congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in the selection process for beneficiaries of a new national elderly care center . It was found that elderly parents of politicians and high government officials were admitted to the institute without going through the appropriate process.	In October 2017, 10 congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in the selection process for beneficiaries of a new national elderly care center . It was found that elderly parents of politicians and high government officials were admitted to the institute without going through the appropriate process. In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.		

Note. None of the text was bolded in the actual study.

We expected that an explicit mention of inequality due to elite corruption would trigger greater blame on the government, compared to when such consequence was implicit. However, the extents to which explicit and implicit inequality increases government blame were not statistically different in all areas of corruption as shown in Table S7 and Figure S5. Thus, we decided to collapse the implicit and explicit conditions, and focused on the treatment effects by corruption topics in the main text of the paper.

Inequality Cue Topic	Implicit	Explicit	Difference (t-statistic)
College admission	0.65	0.64	-0.41, <i>p</i> = .68
Preferential hiring	0.61	0.64	1.47, p = .14
Elderly care	0.66	0.62	-1.65, <i>p</i> = .10

Average government-self blame by experimental conditions: By topic and inequality cue

Note: Government-Self Blame refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns (composite score of blame on education, employment, and retirement), ranging from 1 (greater government-blame) to 0 (greater self-blame).

Figure S5

Effects of explicit inequality cue on government-self blame by topic



Note: Mean and 95% confidence interval of government-self blame by experimental conditions. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 1 (greater government-blame) to 0 (greater self-blame).

We propose two conjectures about the reasons behind this null finding. First, the treatment we devised to manipulate the explicitness of unequal opportunities might have been too weak. We simply inserted a sentence that says "As a consequence, many applicants to [college admissions / corporate employment / elderly care benefits] who met criteria were rejected," which could have been too weak as an intervention to explicitly highlight the potential personal consequences. Another possibility is that people who were not given this extra sentence (the implicit condition) might have still inferred inequality caused by nepotism, thus ultimately having similar reactions with people assigned to the explicit condition.

2) Distribution of Demographics across Experimental Conditions

Table S8

	Experimental Conditions							
	Baseline	Education + Implicit	Education + Explicit	Employment + Implicit	Employment + Explicit	Retirement + Implicit	Retirement + Explicit	Total (%)
Age								
20-29	26	27	21	18	22	26	18	23
30-39	20	24	22	25	26	21	25	23
40-49	27	26	28	28	21	26	33	27
50-59	27	23	28	29	31	27	25	27
Gender								
Female	52	48	45	51	50	48	44	48
Male	48	52	55	49	50	52	56	52
Education								
No college	22	22	21	22	19	23	21	21
College	78	78	79	78	81	77	79	79
Ideology								
Conservative	22	19	25	18	24	23	20	22
Moderate	35	37	30	39	34	41	34	36
Liberal	43	43	45	43	42	36	46	42
Partisan Identity	V							
Incumbent	49	55	55	46	43	51	48	49
Opposition	27	21	24	28	32	23	27	26
Independent	24	24	21	25	26	26	25	24
N	170	166	166	168	172	176	167	1,185

Distribution of demographics by experimental conditions (%)

Note: For Partisan Identity, 5 responses that chose "other" when asked to choose a party that respondents support were excluded because their open-ended responses were not-well defined (e.g., a party that no longer exists, vague (e.g., conservative party), or no response).

Distribution of partisan identity and ideology by strength (%)

Partisan Identity	Weak (%)	Strong (%)	Ν
Incumbent Partisans			
Democratic Party of Korea	32	68	585 (49.6%)
Opposition Partisans (combined)	38	62	305 (25.8%)
Liberty Korea Party	34	66	113
Justice Party	37	63	123
Bareun Party	46	54	65
Party for Democracy and Peace	50	50	4
Independent			290 (24.6%)

Ideology		Slightly (%)	Moderately (%)	Very (%)	
	Liberal	65	30	5	505 (42.6%)
	Conservative	72	23	5	256 (21.6%)
	Moderate				424 (35.8%)
	Total				1 185

Note: Using the two-step questions on partisan identity, the respondents who indicated "yes" to the first question "Is there a political party that you usually think of yourself as a supporter of the party?" were identified as strong partisans to the party that they chose in the subsequent question. The respondents who indicated "No" or "Don't know" to the first question but chose "yes" to the next question "Even so, is there a party that you support relatively more than other parties?" were identified as weak partisans to the party they chose in the following question. Consistent with Table S8, for partisan identity, 5 responses that chose "other" when asked to choose a party that respondents support were excluded because their open-ended responses were not-well defined.

3) Recruitment Process

To collect a sample that is diverse in terms of gender, age, and region, the survey firm, Macromill Embrain, used the quota sampling on the basis of population distributions in South Korea as shown in Table S10. The survey firm used their prescreening data on gender, age, and region in the recruitment. While this quota table is designed for 1,029 respondents, in the process of actual recruitment, the survey firm recruited a few additional respondents, resulting in the final sample of 1,185 respondents. The cost of recruitment was 2,700 Korean won (approx. \$2.48 USD as of November 21, 2018) per respondent.

Table S10

Destar	Condon	Age				T-4-1
Region	Gender	20~29	30~39	40~49	50~59	- Total
	Male	24	26	26	25	20.4
Seoul	Female	24	26	27	26	204
Ducon	Male	8	8	9	9	67
Busan	Female	7	7	9	10	07
D	Male	6	5	7	7	40
Daegu	Female	5	5	7	7	49
	Male	7	7	8	8	50
Incheon	Female	6	7	8	8	59
	Male	4	3	4	4	29
Gwangju	Female	3	3	4	4	
Desiser	Male	4	4	4	4	20
Daejeon	Female	3	3	4	4	30
- Lilaon	Male	3	3	3	4	24
UISan	Female	2	3	3	3	24
Company in the	Male	30	33	38	35	265
Gyeonggi-do	Female	27	31	37	34	265
Concerna de	Male	3	3	4	5	20
Gangwon-do	Female	3	3	4	4	29
	Male	4	4	4	5	21
Chungcheongbuk-do	Female	3	3	4	4	31

Sampling quota for region, gender, and age

- Chungahaangnam da	Male	4	5	6	6	20
Chungeneongham-uo	Female	4	4	5	5	39
Jeollabuk do	Male	4	4	5	5	34
Jeonabuk-do	Female	3	3	5	5	54
Iaollanam do	Male	4	4	5	6	24
Jeonanam-do	Female	3	3	4	5	54
Guoongoonghuk do	Male	6	6	7	8	40
Gyeongsangouk-do	Female	4	5	6	7	49
Guaangaangnam da	Male	7	8	10	10	66
Gyeongsangham-do	Female	6	7	9	9	00
Lain do	Male	1	1	2	2	12
Jeju-do	Female	1	1	2	2	12
Solong	Male	1	1	1	1	Q
Sejong	Female	1	1	1	1	0
Total	Male	120	125	143	144	1 020
Total	Female	105	115	139	138	1,029

Note: This quota table served as the survey firm's target, which slightly diverged from the actual distribution in the sample in Table S8.

4) Manipulation Check

At the end of the survey, the following question was asked to assess how well the key differences across experimental conditions were perceived by the respondents: "Which of the following was mentioned in the news story that you read in this survey?"

- Corporate employment (1) •
- College admission (2)
- Beneficiaries for elderly care (3)
- None of the above (4)

Only the respondents who were assigned to one of the treatment conditions, thus had seen a corruption scandal story, were given this manipulation check question. Following Hauser, Ellsworth, & Gonzalez (2018)'s recommendation, we placed this question at the very end of the survey in order to prevent any unintended influence of this question on outcomes. We did not drop respondents who failed the manipulation check because excluding respondents who failed the manipulation check can result in biased results as suggested by Aronow et al. (2019).

Table S11

Responses to manipulation check by experimental conditions					
	Treatment Conditions				
	College admission	Preferential hiring	Elderly care		
	corruption	corruption	corruption		
College admission	59.9	2.9	4.1		
Corporate employment	31.0	86.8	17.2		
Beneficiaries for elderly care	0.9	2.1	72.3		
None of the above	8.1	8.2	6.4		
Ν	332	340	343		

Note: Entries are the percentage of each response per experimental condition.

Total

22.0 45.0 25.4 7.6 1,015 As shown in Table S11, responses across different conditions indicate that the key experimental manipulation—the area of corruption scandal—in this study was effective. In all treatment conditions, a majority of responses were consistent with the intention of the study design. In the condition with college admissions corruption, 59.9% of the respondents said they were given a story about college admissions. In the condition where respondents were given a preferential hiring corruption story, 86.8% of respondents recalled that they were given a story about corporate employment. Among respondents assigned to the condition with an elderly care corruption story, 72.3% recalled that they were given a story about beneficiaries for elderly care.

Main Findings in Tabular Form

1) Corruption Scandal Effects on Overall Blame

Table S12

Corruption scandal effects on blame: All respondents and by degree of anxiety

		Government-Self Blame	
	All Respondents	More Worried	Less Worried
College admission	0.041**	0.066***	0.008
-	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.028)
Preferential Hiring	0.023	0.057**	-0.007
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Elderly care	0.032*	0.043*	0.020
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Constant	0.607***	0.625***	0.582***
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.023)
N	1,185	658	527

Note: Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *College admission* = 1 if college admission corruption, 0 otherwise; *Preferential Hiring* = 1 if Preferential hiring corruption =, 0 otherwise; *Elderly care* = 1 if elderly care corruption =, 0 otherwise. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 1 (greater government-blame) to 0 (greater self-blame). *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

2) Corruption Scandal Effects on Topic-specific Blame

As shown in Table S13, compared to the baseline, blame for the government specifically for education concerns (first column) increased upon learning about college admission corruption (0.08, p < .01) or elderly care corruption (0.05, p < .05). Interestingly, a corruption scandal on *elderly care* prompted people to attribute greater blame to the government on *education* concerns, implying a potential link between elderly care corruption and blame for education. This finding demonstrates that corruption scandals on certain topics can spill over to blame for other topics as well. Blame for retirement and employment concerns (second and third columns), in contrast, were minimally affected by corruption treatments. College admission corruption had a marginally significant effect on employment-specific blame (0.03, p = .11), again indicating a potential spillover effect of corruption on blame across topics. These results suggest the treatment effects among all respondents in Table S13 are largely driven by blame for education concerns.

Table S13

1 00	1 1 0	1	
	Education Blame	Employment Blame	Retirement Blame
College admission	0.08***	0.03^{+}	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Preferential hiring	0.03	0.03	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Elderly care	0.05**	0.03	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.60***	0.60***	0.63***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ν	1,185	1,185	1,185

Corruption scandal effects on topic-specific blame: All respondents

Note: Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *[Education / Employment / Retirement] Blame* refers to the degree to which individuals blame the government as the cause of personal concerns on *[education / employment / retirement]*, where higher value indicates blaming the government more and lower value indicates blaming oneself more (coded to range from 0 to 1). *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. $^{\dagger}p = .109$.

Table S14

Corruption scandal effects on topic-specific blame: By degree of anxiety (subgroup analysis)

_	Education Blame		Employm	Employment Blame		Retirement Blame	
	More	Less	More	Less	More	Less	
	worried	worried	worried	worried	worried	worried	
College admission	0.12***	0.02	0.06**	0.002	0.02	0.01	
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Preferential hiring	0.08***	-0.02	0.07**	-0.02	0.02	0.01	
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Elderly care	0.09***	0.001	0.05*	0.01	-0.01	0.05	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Constant	0.60***	0.59***	0.60***	0.59***	0.67***	0.57***	
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	
N	658	527	658	527	658	527	

Note: Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *[Education / Employment / Retirement] Blame* refers to the degree to which individuals blame the government as the cause of personal concerns on *[education / employment / retirement]*, where higher value indicates blaming the government more and lower value indicates blaming oneself more (coded to range from 0 to 1). *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

3) Corruption Scandal Effects: Interaction Analysis

In Table S15, we use interaction terms to test the difference in average treatment effects (ATE) between more worried and less worried individuals. For example, the ATE of College Admission treatment among *more worried* individuals (Anxiety =1 in Table S15) is calculated as the coefficient [Admission] + [Admission x Anxiety], and ATE of College Admission treatment

among *less worried* individuals (Anxiety = 0 in Table S15) is calculated as the coefficient [Admission]. Thus, the interaction term [Admission x Anxiety] captures the difference in the ATE of college admission treatment between more and less worried individuals. The same interpretation applies to the Hiring and Elderly Care treatments.

Table S15

Corruption scandal effects on overall and topic-specific blame: By degree of anxiety (interaction analysis)

	Overall	Education	Employment	Retirement
	Blame	Blame	Blame	Blame
Admission	0.01	0.02	0.002	0.005
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Hiring	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.01
_	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Elderly	0.02	0.001	0.01	0.05
-	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Anxiety	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.10***
-	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Admission x Anxiety	0.06	0.10**	0.06	0.02
-	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hiring x Anxiety	0.06*	0.10**	0.09**	0.002
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Elderly x Anxiety	0.02	0.09**	0.04	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.58***	0.59***	0.59***	0.57***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ν	1,185	1,185	1,185	1,185

Note: Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 0 (greater self-blame) to 1 (greater government-blame). *Admission* = 1 if college admission corruption, 0 otherwise; *Hiring* = 1 if preferential hiring corruption, 0 otherwise; *Elderly* = 1 if elderly care corruption, 0 otherwise. *Anxiety* = 1 if more worried about personal grievances on education, employment, and retirement, 0 if less worried. **p* < .1; ***p* < .05; ****p* < .01.

4) Corruption Effects by Ideology and Partisanship

Table S16

Corruption scandal effects on government-self blame: By ideology and partisanship

	Government-Self Blame			
	Liberals	Conservatives	Incumbent Partisans	Opposition Partisans
College admission	0.043*	0.008	0.049**	0.041
	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.031)
Preferential hiring	0.014	0.012	0.034	-0.008
-	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.032)

Elderly care	0.048*	0.002	0.042	0.013	
	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.031)	
Constant	0.605***	0.642***	0.601***	0.639***	
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.024)	
N	505	256	585	305	

Note: Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *College admission* = 1 if college admission corruption =, 0 otherwise; *Preferential hiring* = 1 if Preferential hiring corruption, 0 otherwise; *Elderly care* = 1 if elderly care corruption, 0 otherwise. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 1 (government-blame) to 0 (self-blame). *Incumbent Partisans* refer to partisans who identify with Democratic Party of Korea (DPK). *Opposition Partisans* refer to partisans who identify parties other than DPK. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

Table S17

Corruption scandal effects on government-self blame among moderates, pure independents, and partisans of major opposition party

	Government-Self Blame				
	Moderates (Ideology)	(Pure) Independents	Major Opposition Partisans		
College admission	0.06*	0.03	0.02		
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)		
Preferential hiring	0.04	0.04	-0.09		
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)		
Elderly care	0.03	0.04	-0.06		
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)		
Constant	0.59***	0.58***	0.68***		
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)		
N	424	290	113		

Note: Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *College admission* = 1 if college admission corruption =, 0 otherwise; *Preferential hiring* = 1 if Preferential hiring corruption, 0 otherwise; *Elderly care* = 1 if elderly care corruption, 0 otherwise. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 1 (government-blame) to 0 (self-blame). *Major Opposition Partisans* refer to partisans who identify with the major opposition party, Liberal Korea Party (LKP). *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

Additional Analyses

1) Alternative Median Split of the Degree of Anxiety

To analyze how anxiety moderate the effects of corruption scandals, we used the median split approach (Iacobucci et al., 2015). The median level of anxiety about personal concerns was the 0.6667, indicated as the vertical line shown in Figure S6, which included 170 respondents.

Figure S6

The distribution of anxiety (horizontal axis, ranging from 0 to 1) and the median level of anxiety (vertical line)



There are two choices to create binary groups on the basis of this median: include individuals with the median level of anxiety in either higher-anxiety group or lower-anxiety group. When we take the first approach, there are 658 more worried and 527 less worried individuals. With the second approach, there are 488 more worried and 697 less worried individuals. In the main text of the paper, we present the results based on the first approach, because 1) the number of respondents is relatively more even across the two groups, and 2) the median is closer to the higher end of the anxiety scale, so the substantive meaning of median level anxiety is relatively higher anxiety.

To confirm that our substantive findings are robust to the alternative way of median-split categorization, we present the results based on the second approach in Table S18. The statistical significance and direction of treatment effects, and substantive findings stay the same, reinforcing the robustness of our findings on how anxiety moderate the effects of corruption scandals on blame attribution.

Table S18

	Government-Self Blame				
	More worried	Less worried			
College admission	0.08***	0.02			
	(0.03)	(0.02)			
Preferential hiring	0.08***	-0.003			
	(0.03)	(0.02)			
Elderly care	0.05*	0.02			
	(0.03)	(0.02)			
Constant	0.62***	0.60***			
	(0.02)	(0.02)			
N	488	697			

Treatment effects of corruption scandal stories on government-self blame by anxiety levels (Alternative median split)

Note: Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

Figure S7

Corruption scandal effects on government-self blame by anxiety levels (Alternative median split)



Note: Mean and 95% confidence interval of government-self blame attribution by experimental conditions.

2) Analysis of Treatment Effects with Demographic Controls

As shown in Table S19, the direction and statistical significance of corruption scandal effects remained the same with the main results, even after controlling for gender, age, education, and income.

Table S19

Corruption scandal effects on blame attribution with demographic controls

	Government-Self Blame				
	All Respondents	More Worried	Less Worried		
College admission	0.05**	0.07***	0.01		
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Preferential hiring	0.03	0.06**	-0.005		
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Elderly care	0.04**	0.04*	0.02		
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Female	0.02*	0.01	0.02		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)		
Age	-0.002***	-0.001	-0.003***		
	(0.0005)	(0.0007)	(0.001)		
College	0.02	0.01	0.03*		
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.001)		
Income	-0.002	-0.0005	0.001		
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)		
Constant	0.69***	0.65***	0.67***		
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)		
N	1,147	631	516		

Note: Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *College admission* = 1 if college admission corruption, 0 otherwise; *Preferential*

hiring = 1 if Preferential hiring corruption =, 0 otherwise; *Elderly care* = 1 if elderly care corruption =, 0 otherwise. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 1 (greater government-blame) to 0 (greater self-blame). *Female* = 1 if female, 0 if male; *Age* indicates the respondent's age (range from 20 to 59); *College* = 1 if college graduates, 0 if no college degree. *Income* indicates monthly income on an 11-point scale (1 = monthly income < 1,000,000 won (approx. \$1k) ~ 11 = monthly income > 10,000,000 won(approx. \$10k); **p* < .1; ***p* < .05; ****p* < .01.

In Table S20, we additionally confirmed that the degree of anxiety about personal concerns was not strongly correlated with any of the political predispositions or demographic variables. Overall, these correlations were relatively weak (< .20), suggesting anxiety and other variables were distinguishable constructs (discriminant validity is indicated by weaker coefficients (e.g., <.20), Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). This result indicates that the degree of anxiety was not simply a variable that replicates variations in other demographic or political characteristics, rendering more confidence in the unique role of anxiety in this study.

Table S20

Correlations among anxiety, political preatspositions, and demographic variables								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
1 Anxiety	1							
2 Ideology	05	1						
3 Incumbent Partisan	02	.30***	1					
4 Female	.01	01	.07	1				
5 Age	15***	05	17***	.00				
6 College	02	.01	.02	07**	.07**	1		
7 Income	18***	07**	07*	.03	.03	.14***	1	

Completions groups griate political predignositions, and demographic variables

Note: Entries are bivariate correlations among anxiety, political predispositions, and demographic variables. Anxiety indicates the degree of worry about personal grievances on on education, employment, and retirement, coded to range from 0 to 1. *Ideology* indicates conservative-liberal ideology (1=very conservative ~ 7=very liberal); Incumbent Partisan = 1 if incumbent partisan, 0 if partisans who support non-incumbent parties; *Female* = 1 if female, 0 if male; *Age* indicates the respondent's age (range from 20 to 59); College = 1 if college graduates, 0 if no college degree; . *Income* indicates monthly income on an 11-point scale (1 = monthly income < 1,000,000 won $(approx. \$1k) \sim 11 = monthly income > 10,000,000 won (approx. \$10k); *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p$ < .01.

3) Exploring Moderating Roles of Demographic Variables

We additionally explored whether demographic variables (gender, age, education, education, and income) may moderate the magnitude of treatment effects in Table S21. In Models 1 and 2, we interact each corruption treatment—"Admission" (college admission), "Hiring" (preferential hiring), "Elderly" (Elderly care)—with binary indicators of gender ("Female") and education ("College"). In Models 3 and 4, we interact each corruption treatment—"Admission" (college admission), "Hiring" (preferential hiring), "Elderly" (Elderly care)-median-split indicators for age and income.

We found little evidence that the effects of corruption story treatments were moderated by age, education, or income. Consistent with prior findings that females tend to be more

punitive to corruption (Alexander et al., 2020), female respondents blamed the government to a greater extent than male respondents upon learning about corruption on college admission, but such moderating relationship was not found for corruption on preferential hiring or elderly care.

Table S21

Corruption scandal effects on blame attribution: By demographic traits

	Government-Self Blame						
	Model 1	Model 2	-	Model 3	Model 4		
	(gender)	(age)		(education)	(income)		
Admission	0.01	0.04**	Admission	0.05	0.05*		
	(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.04)	(0.03)		
Hiring	-0.01	0.03	Hiring	0.05	0.02		
	(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.04)	(0.03)		
Elderly	0.01	0.03	Elderly	0.07*	0.02		
	(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.04)	(0.03)		
Female	-0.03		College	0.04			
	(0.03)			(0.03)			
Admission x	0.07**		Admission x	-0.01			
Female	(0.04)		College	(0.04)			
Hiring x	0.06		Hiring x	-0.04			
Female	(0.04)		College	(0.04)			
Elderly x	0.05		Elderly x	-0.04			
Female	(0.04)		College	(0.04)			
Age_cat		-0.04	Income_cat		-0.01		
-		(0.03)			(0.04)		
Admission x		-0.01	Admission x		-0.01		
Age_cat		(0.04)	Income_cat		(0.04)		
Hiring x		-0.01	Hiring x		0.01		
Age_cat		(0.04)	Income_cat		(0.04)		
Elderly x		0.01	Elderly x		0.02		
Age_cat		(0.04)	Income_cat		(0.04)		
Constant	0.62***	0.63***	Constant	0.58***	0.61***		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)		
N	1,185	1,185	N	1,185	1,147		

Note: Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *Admission* = 1 if college admission corruption, 0 otherwise; *Hiring* = 1 if preferential hiring corruption =, 0 otherwise; *Elderly* = 1 if elderly care corruption =, 0 otherwise. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 1 (greater government-blame) to 0 (greater self-blame). *Female* = 1 if female, 0 if male; *Age_cat* = 1 if median age or older (41-59), 0 if younger than median age (20-40); *College* = 1 if college graduates, 0 if no college degree; *Income_cat* = 1 if monthly income is equal to or greater than median income (4,000,000 won, approx. \$4k), 0 if monthly income is less than median income. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

Survey Questionnaire

1) English (Translated)

1. Pre-treatment Questions

[Age] When is your birth year? _____

[Gender] What is your gender?

- Male (1)
- Female (2)

[Region] In which province do you currently reside?

- Seoul (1)
- Busan (2)
- Daegu (3)
- Incheon (4)
- Gwangju (5)
- Daejun (6)
- Ulsan (7)
- Gyeonggi-do (8)
- Gangwon-do (9)
- Chunchungbuk-do (10)
- Chungchungnam-do (11)
- Jeonlabuk-do (12)
- Jeonlanam-do (13)
- Gyeongsangbuk-do (14)
- Gyeongsannam-do (15)
- Jeju-do (16)
- Sejong (17)

[Spouse] What is your marital status?

- Never married (1)
- Married (Have a spouse) (2)
- Divorced (3)
- Widowed (4)
- Separated (5)
- Other _____ (6)

[Children] Do you have a child (children)?

- Yes [Number of children: ____] (1)
- No (2)

[Parent] When is the birth year of your parent and are your parent alive?

		Alive (1)
1. Father	Birth year	Dead (2)
		Other (Describe:) (3)
		Alive (1)
2. Mother	Birth year	Dead (2)
		Other (Describe:) (3)

[Partisan Identity] PID1 Is there a political party that you usually think of yourself as a supporter of the party?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)
- Don't know (3)

PID2 [display if PID1 == 1] If so, which party do you support?

- Democratic Party of Korea (1)
- Liberty Korea Party (2)
- Justice Party (3)
- Bareun Party (4)
- Party for Democracy and Peace (5)
- Other (6) _____

PID3 [display if PID1 == 2 or 3] Even so, is there a party that you support relatively more than other parties?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

PID4 [display if PID3 == 1] If so, which party do you support relatively more than other parties?

- Democratic Party of Korea (1)
- Liberty Korea Party (2)
- Justice Party (3)
- Bareun Party (4)
- Party for Democracy and Peace (5)
- Other (6) _____

[Ideology] People usually distinguish liberalism and conservatism. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- Very conservative (1)
- Conservative (2)
- Slightly Conservative (3)
- Middle (4)
- Slightly Liberal (5)
- Liberal (6)
- Very liberal (7)

[Anxiety] Here is a list of problems that many people these days experience in their personal lives. Among **[employment, education, retirement]**, what is the concern that you have about yourself or your family members? For each topic, how much are you worried about yourself and your family members?

Employment	Extremely worried (1)	Very worried (2)	Moderately worried (3)	A little worried (4)	Not at all worried (5)
Yourself (1)					
Your spouse (2)					
Your children (3)					
Your parents (4)					

Education	Extremely worried (1)	Very worried (2)	Moderately worried (3)	A little worried (4)	Not at all worried (5)
Yourself (1)					
Your spouse (2)					
Your children (3)					
Your parents (4)					

Retirement/Aging	Extremely worried (1)	Very worried (2)	Moderately worried (3)	A little worried (4)	Not at all worried (5)
Yourself (1)					
Your spouse (2)					
Your children (3)					
Your parents (4)					

* Display "your spouse," "your children," "your parent" items if the respondent indicated earlier in the survey that they have each member in their family.

[Open-ended Employment Concerns]. Regarding **Employment**, please elaborate on the worries you have about yourself or your family member.

* Skip if 'not at all' to all four categories on employment

[Open-ended Employment Concerns]. Regarding **Education**, please elaborate on the worries you have about yourself or your family member.

* Skip if 'not at all' to all four categories on education

[Open-ended Retirement Concerns]. Regarding Retirement/Aging, please elaborate on the worries you have about yourself or your family member.

* Skip if 'not at all' to all four categories on retirement

2. Experimental Treatment

[Instruction]

The following story is about one of the topics that have been in the news recently. Before moving on to the next questions, please take a moment to read the story. We will ask you some questions about your thoughts about what was discussed in the story.

Note: Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 7 conditions.

1. Control group

[No vignette is provided]

2. College admission, Implicit inequality cue

In October 2017, 10 congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in *the admission process of universities*. It was found that

children of politicians and high government officials were admitted to prestigious universities without going through the appropriate process.

3. College admission, Explicit inequality cue

In October 2017, 10 congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in *the admission process of universities*. It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were admitted to prestigious universities without going through the appropriate process. In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.

4. Preferential hiring, Implicit inequality cue

In October 2017, 10 congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in *the employment process of companies*. It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were employed at large companies without going through the appropriate process.

5. Preferential hiring, Explicit inequality cue

In October 2017, 10 congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in *the employment process of companies*. It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were employed at large companies without going through the appropriate process. In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.

6. Elderly care, Implicit inequality cue

In October 2017, 10 congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in *the selection process for beneficiaries of a new national elderly care center*. It was found that elderly parents of politicians and high government officials were admitted to the elderly care institute without going through the appropriate process.

7. Elderly care, Explicit inequality cue

In October 2017, 10 congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in *the selection process for beneficiaries of a new national elderly care center*. It was found that elderly parents of politicians and high government officials were admitted to the elderly care institute without going through the appropriate process. In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.

3. Post-treatment Question

[Government-Self Blame for Personal Concerns] To what extent do you think either the government or yourself is responsible as the cause of your recent concerns about yourself or your family members?

In the answer choices, "government" broadly refers to politicians, central and local governments, government's relationship with Cheobol system, and government's management of economy. "Myself" broadly refers to your educational background, your family's financial condition, the degree of your ambition and effort, and your personal choices.

	Government is completely responsible [1]	Government is somewhat responsible [2]	Equally responsible [3]	I myself am somewhat responsible [4]	I myself am completely responsible [5]
Employment (1)					
Education (2)					
Retirement/Aging (3)					

4. End of the survey

[Income] Could you you give us an estimate of your family's monthly income? This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest and all other income for every member of your family living in your house.

- Less than 1,000,000 won [1]
- 1,000,000 ~ 1,990,000 won [2]
- 2,000,000 ~ 2,990,000 won [3]
- 3,000,000 ~ 3,990,000 won [4]
- 4,000,000 ~ 4,990,000 won [5]
- 5,000,000 ~ 5,990,000 won [6]
- 6,000,000 ~ 6,990,000 won [7]
- 7,000,000 ~ 7,990,000 won [8]
- 8,000,000 ~ 8,990,000 won [9]
- 9,000,000 ~ 9,990,000 won [10]
- Greater than 10,000,000 won [11]
- Don't know [11]

[Education] What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- No education (1)
- Graduated elementary school (2)
- Graduate middle school (3)
- Graduated high school (4)
- Bachelor's degree in college (2-year or 4-year college) (5)
- Graduate degree (Master's or Doctoral) (6)
- Other, please explain: (7) ______

[Personal Corruption Experience] Here is a list of items some people experience. In your life, have you personally experienced any of these?

	Yes (1)	No (2)
A police officer asked you, personally, to pay a bribe		
A public official asked you, personally, to pay a bribe		
You, personally, were asked to pay a bribe at work		
You, personally, were asked to pay a bribe in the school system		
You, personally, were asked to pay a bribe at a hospital or a doctor's office		

[Display if condition != 1] **[Manipulation Check]** Which of the following was mentioned in the news story that you read in this survey?

- Corporate employment (1)
- College admission (2)
- Beneficiaries for elderly care (3)
- None of the above (4)

2) Korean (Original)

1. 실험문항 이전

[나이] 귀하의 출생연도는 어떻게 되십니까? _____

[성별] 귀하의 성별은 어떻게 되십니까?

- 1) 남성
- 2) 여성

[지역] 다음 중 귀하의 거주지(주민등록주소지 기준)는 어디입니까?

- 1) 서울특별시
- 2) 부산광역시
- 3) 대구광역시
- 4) 인천광역시
- 5) 광주광역시
- 6) 대전광역시
- 7) 울산광역시
- 8) 경기도
- 9) 강원도
- 10) 충청북도
- 11) 충청남도
- 12) 전라북도
- 13) 전라남도
- 14) 경상북도
- 15) 경상남도
- 16) 제주특별자치도
- 17) 세종특별자치시

[배우자] 귀하의 혼인상태는 어떻게 되십니까?

- 1) 미혼
- 2) 기혼 (배우자 있음)
- 3) 이혼
- 4) 사별
- 5) 별거
- 6) 기타 (직접 작성:_____)

[자녀] 자녀유무를 선택해 주세요.

- 1) 있음() 명
- 2) 없음

[부모님] 귀하의 부모님의 출생연도 및 생존해 계신지 여부는 어떻게 되십니까?

		1) 생존
1. 아버지	년생	2) 사망
		3) 기타 (직접 작성:)
		1) 생존
2. 어머니	년생	2) 사망
		3) 기타 (직접 작성:)

[정당일체감] PID1 평소 지지하는 정당이 있다고 생각하십니까?

- 1) 그렇다
- 2) 아니다
- 3) 모르겠다

PID2 [Display if PID1 == 1] 그렇다면, 어느 정당을 지지하십니까?

- 1) 더불어민주당
- 2) 자유한국당
- 3) 정의당
- 4) 바른미래당
- 5) 민주평화당
- 6) 기타 _____

PID3 [Display if PID1 == 2 or 3] 그렇지 않다면, 다른 정당보다 비교적 더 지지한다고 생각하는 정당이 있습니까?

- 1) 그렇다 [Q7으로]
- 2) 아니다 [Q8로]

PID4 [Display if PID3 == 1] 그렇다면, 다른 정당보다 더 지지한다고 생각하는 정당은 어디입니까?

- 1) 더불어민주당
- 2) 자유한국당
- 3) 정의당
- 4) 바른미래당
- 5) 민주평화당
- 6) 기타 ____

[정치이념] 정치에서 사람들은 보통 진보와 보수를 구분합니다. 귀하께서는 귀하 자신이 어디에 속한다고 생각하십니까?

매우 보수적	보수적	약간 보수적	중도	약간 진보적	진보적	매우 진보적
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

[개인적 걱정] 아래의 표에는 최근 많은 사람들이 개인적인 삶에서 겪고 있는 문제들의 목록이 제시되어 있습니다. 다음 목록 [취업/고용, 교육, 은퇴/고령화] 중 귀하가 본인 또는 가족구성원 (배우자, 자녀, 부모님 등)에 관하여 최근 갖고 있는 걱정거리는 무엇입니까? 각 항목마다 귀하가 본인과 가족구성원에 대하여 걱정하는 정도는 어떻게 되십니까?

취업/고용	매우 걱정한다 (1)	걱정하는 편이다 (2)	보통이다 (3)	걱정하지 않는 편이다 (4)	전혀 걱정하지 않는다 (5)
본인 (1)					
배우자 (2)					
자녀 (3)					
부모님 (4)					

교육	매우 걱정한다 (1)	걱정하는 편이다 (2)	보통이다 (3)	걱정하지 않는 편이다 (4)	전혀 걱정하지 않는다 (5)
본인 (1)					
배우자 (2)					
자녀 (3)					
부모님 (4)					

은퇴/고령화	매우 걱정한다 (1)	걱정하는 편이다 (2)	보통이다 (3)	걱정하지 않는 편이다 (4)	전혀 걱정하지 않는다 (5)
본인 (1)					
배우자 (2)					
자녀 (3)					
부모님 (4)					

(* 배우자, 자녀, 부모님 항목은 설문 초반 관련 문항에 대한 응답에 따라 해당 가족 구성원이 있는 경우에만 활성화)

[개인적 걱정: 취업/고용] 취업/고용과 관련하여, 본인 또는 귀하의 가족구성원에 관하여 갖고 있는 걱정거리가 무엇인지 구체적으로 적어주세요._____

(* 취업/고용 항목에 모든 구성원에 5. 전혀 아님을 응답할 시 SKIP)

[개인적 걱정: 교육]교육과 관련하여, 본인 또는 귀하의 가족구성원에 관하여 갖고 있는 걱정거리가 무엇인지 구체적으로 적어주세요._____

(* 교육 항목에 모든 구성원에 5. 전혀 아님을 응답할 시 SKIP)

[개인적 걱정: 은퇴/고령화]은퇴/고령화와 관련하여, 본인 또는 귀하의 가족구성원에 관하여 갖고 있는 걱정거리가 무엇인지 구체적으로 적어주세요. ______ (* 은퇴/고령화 항목에 모든 구성원에 5. 전혀 아님을 응답할 시 SKIP)

2. 실험문항

다음의 글은 최근 뉴스에서 다루어진 주제 중 하나에 관한 글입니다. 다음 문항으로 넘어가기 전에, 이 글을 읽어주시기 바랍니다. 해당 사건에 관하여 귀하께서 어떠한 생각을 갖고 계신지 여쭙는 문항이 주어질 예정입니다.

[각 응답자에게 일곱 가지 조건 중 하나가 무작위로 제시 됨]

1. Control group (통제군)

[아무런 글도 제공되지 않음]

2. College admission, Implicit inequality cue

지난 2017 년 10 월, 국회의원 10 명이 부패 스캔들에 연루되었음이 밝혀진 사건이 있었습니다. 이들은 정부 권력을 이용하여 *대학 입시*에 관여한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이 사건에서 정치인과 고위 공직자의 자녀들이 정당한 절차를 거치지 않고 일류 대학에 입학하였음이 밝혀졌습니다.

3. College admission, Explicit inequality cue

지난 2017 년 10 월, 국회의원 10 명이 부패 스캔들에 연루되었음이 밝혀진 사건이 있었습니다. 이들은 정부 권력을 이용하여 *대학 입시*에 관여한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이 사건에서 정치인과 고위 공직자의 자녀들이 정당한 절차를 거치지 않고 일류 대학에 입학하였음이 밝혀졌습니다. <u>이로 인하여, 입학 자격을 충족했던</u> 수많은 지원자들이 대학 입시에서 불합격 통보를 받은 것으로 드러났습니다.

4. Preferential hiring, Implicit inequality cue

지난 2017 년 10 월, 국회의원 10 명이 부패 스캔들에 연루되었음이 밝혀진 사건이 있었습니다. 이들은 정부 권력을 이용하여 *기업들의 채용 과정*에 관여한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이 사건에서 정치인과 고위 공직자의 자녀들이 정당한 절차를 거치지 않고 대기업에 취직하였음이 밝혀졌습니다.

5. Preferential hiring, Explicit inequality cue

지난 2017 년 10 월, 국회의원 10 명이 부패 스캔들에 연루되었음이 밝혀진 사건이 있었습니다. 이들은 정부 권력을 이용하여 *기업들의 채용 과정*에 관여한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이 사건에서 정치인과 고위 공직자의 자녀들이 정당한 절차를 거치지 않고 대기업에 취직하였음이 밝혀졌습니다. <u>이로 인하여, 취업 자격을</u> 충족했던 수많은 지원자들이 채용시험에서 불합격 통보를 받은 것으로 드러났습니다.

6. Elderly care, Implicit inequality cue

지난 2017 년 10 월, 국회의원 10 명이 부패 스캔들에 연루되었음이 밝혀진 사건이 있었습니다. 이들은 정부 권력을 이용하여 *국립 양로원 수혜자 선정 과정*에 관여한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이 사건에서 정치인과 고위 공직자의 노부모들이 정당한 절차를 거치지 않고 수혜자로 선정되었음이 밝혀졌습니다.

7. Elderly care, Explicit inequality cue

지난 2017 년 10 월, 국회의원 10 명이 부패 스캔들에 연루되었음이 밝혀진 사건이 있었습니다. 이들은 정부 권력을 이용하여 *국립 양로원 수혜자 선정 과정*에 관여한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이 사건에서 정치인과 고위 공직자의 노부모들이 정당한 절차를 거치지 않고 수혜자로 선정되었음이 밝혀졌습니다. <u>이로 인하여, 수혜자</u> 자격을 충족했던 수많은 지원자들이 수혜 대상자 선발 과정에서 불합격 통보를 받은 것으로 드러났습니다.

3. 실험문항 이후

[정부-본인 책임 평가] 귀하가 본인 또는 가족구성원 (배우자, 자녀, 부모님 등)에 관하여 최근 갖고 있는 걱정거리의 원인으로, 정부와 귀하 자신 중 누구의 책임이 더 크다고 생각하십니까? 선택지 중 "정부 책임"에서 '정부'는 정치인, 중앙정부, 지방정부, 정부와 재벌 간의 관계, 정부의 경제 관리를 포괄적으로 의미하며. 선택지 중 "본인 책임"에서 '본인'은 귀하의 교육 배경, 가정의 경제적 여건, 개인적인 야망과 노력의 정도, 개인적 선택을 포괄적으로 의미합니다.

	완전히 정부	대체로 정부	동등한 책임 (3)	대체로 본인	완전히 본인
	책임 (1)	책임 (2)		책임 (4)	책임 (5)
취업/고용 (1)					
교육 (2)					
은퇴/고령화 (3)					

4. 설문조사 마지막 부분

[소득] 귀하 댁의 한 달 가구소득은 얼마나 되나요? 가족 구성원 전체의 월급, 상여금, 은행이자 등을 모두 포함하여 개략적 으로 말씀해 주세요.

- 1) 100 만원 미만
- 2) 100-199 만원
- 3) 200-299 만원
- 4) 300-399 만원
- 5) 400-499 만원
- 6) 500-599 만원
- 7) 600-699 만원
- 8) 700-799 만원
- 9) 800-899 만원
- 10) 900-999 만원
- 11) 1,000 만원 이상
- 12) 잘 모름

[학력] 학교를 어디까지 마치셨나요?

- 1) 무학
- 2) 초등(국민)학교 졸업
- 3) 중학교 졸업
- 4) 고등학교 졸업
- 5) 대학교 졸업(2~4 년제)
- 6) 대학원 졸업(석/박사)
- 7) 기타 _____

[부정부패 개인적 경험] 다음은 사람들이 겪을 수 있는 경험의 목록입니다. 귀하는 살아오면서 다음과 같은 사건을 경험한 적이 있습니까?

	예(1)	아니오(2)
경찰에게서 개인적으로 뇌물을 요구 받은 적이 있다. (1)		
공무원에게서 개인적으로 뇌물을 요구 받은 적이 있다. (2)		
직장에서 개인적으로 뇌물을 요구 받은 적이 있다. (3)		
학교에서 개인적으로 뇌물을 요구 받은 적이 있다. (4)		
병원에서 개인적으로 뇌물을 요구 받은 적이 있다. (5)		

[실험조작 점검; *통제군에게는 제시하지 않음*] 설문조사 중반부에 보셨던 정치인 부패 스캔들에 관한 글은 다음 중 무엇과 가장 관련이 깊습니까?

- 1) 기업 채용
- 2) 대학 입시
- 3) 국립 요양원 수혜자 선정
- 4) 해당사항 없음

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