

**Can Corruption Connect You to Politics?**  
**The Effects of Corruption Scandals on Blaming the Government for Personal Concerns**

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March 23, 2023

**Author Note**

Authors are listed in alphabetical order and contributed equally to this work. This research was supported by the SeAH Haiam Arts and Sciences Scholarship from the Nam Center for Korean Studies at the University of Michigan. We will make our data, code, and study materials available through an Open Science Framework link upon publication of this paper. This study was not preregistered. This work involves no conflicts of interests and was approved by the university Institutional Review Board.

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**Abstract**

When do corruption scandals trigger citizens to punish a poor-performing government? Prior research suggests that citizens often fail to punish governments with subpar policy outcomes because they tend to isolate politics from their personal life and avoid blaming one's own party. Challenging these popular beliefs, our findings from a survey experiment in South Korea indicate that corruption scandals accusing elected officials of nepotism in areas relevant to everyday concerns (college admission, preferential hiring, and elderly care benefits) trigger people to blame the government as the cause of their personal concerns. This effect is prominent among individuals who are highly worried about their personal struggles on education, employment, and retirement, implying the importance of anxiety as a driving factor. We also find that corruption scandals can cause partisans whose party is in power, who are otherwise less likely to blame the incumbent government, to attribute greater blame to the government. These findings imply that corruption scandals can alter perceptions of how government performance affects personal lives. Overall, the study suggests that corruption scandals involving nepotism can give rise to a significant bipartisan opposition against the incumbent government, as seen during the 2016-2017 South Korean protest movement.

**Keywords:** corruption, blame, anxiety, nepotism, sociotropic politics, personal stake



24 focusing on elections, for instance whether voters reelect corrupt actors (Klašnja & Tucker,  
25 2013; Ferraz & Finan, 2011), and events such as economic downturns (Bisgaard, 2015).

26 In search of conditions under which corruption can motivate people to reflect on  
27 government performance and blame the incumbent government, we investigate how national-  
28 level corruption scandals featuring nepotism in areas of everyday concern can affect the degree  
29 to which people blame the government for personal grievances. Corruption scandals can help  
30 citizens overcome the obstacles of limited information and in-group favoritism in two ways.  
31 First, wrongdoing is easier to comprehend in corruption scandals compared to national economic  
32 issues that are often complex. Second, when corruption scandals highlight unfair advantages in  
33 areas pertaining to everyday concerns, citizens' tendencies to distance politics from their  
34 personal lives weaken, increasing their proclivity to see the government as responsible for their  
35 personal grievances. In particular, when corruption by elected officials involve nepotism, which  
36 refers to the practice of people using their positions to give their relatives, friends, or allies  
37 unearned advantages, we expect it will generate a strong perception of unequal opportunities  
38 among the public. Thus, we expect nepotism-style corruption scandals in education,  
39 employment, and retirement will trigger citizens to blame the government rather than themselves  
40 as the cause of personal grievances. Because anxiety triggers individuals to be more responsive  
41 to new information (Brader & Marcus, 2013; Gadarian & Albertson, 2014), we expect these  
42 effects will be especially strong among individuals who are highly worried about their personal  
43 circumstances on these issues.

44 We tested our theoretical expectations through a survey experiment in South Korea with  
45 three findings. First, the results from the experiment indicate that corruption scandals about  
46 nepotism in college admission, preferential hiring, and elderly care benefits motivate people to

47 attribute greater blame to the government as the cause of their personal grievances. Second, this  
48 trend is strongest among individuals who are highly worried about these issues. Third, corruption  
49 scandals increased blame attribution to the government among incumbent partisans, who are  
50 otherwise disinclined to blame their own party. Overall, corruption scandals featuring nepotism  
51 in areas of critical wellbeing can prompt people to blame their personal concerns on the  
52 government, thereby setting the stage for holding those in power accountable for policy failures.

53 We conducted our study in South Korea because a successful presidential impeachment  
54 in 2016-2017 informed our theoretical expectations and study design. The preceding corruption  
55 scandal heavily featured nepotism, motivated widespread public discussions that blamed the  
56 government for personal hardships, and culminated in devastating electoral losses for the  
57 incumbent party at the time (Campbell, 2016; McCurry, 2017). Given this background, South  
58 Korea offers an ideal context to test our expectations about how nepotism-style corruption  
59 scandals affect citizens' perceptions of government.

60 Our study makes three contributions. First, while prior research has focused on electoral  
61 consequences of corruption, such as vote choices (Boas et al., 2019; Klašnja & Tucker, 2013;  
62 Ferraz & Finan, 2011), we examine non-electoral consequences of corruption, namely blame for  
63 personal hardships. Second, our findings speak to the debate in the literature about whether and  
64 under what circumstances individuals isolate or connect their personal concerns to national  
65 government performance (Chong et al., 2001; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981) by using a novel  
66 dependent variable that assesses blame either to government or the respondent for personal  
67 grievances. Finally, our study is one of the first to explore nepotism as a particular form of  
68 corruption. Because corruption scandals are extraordinary yet recurring events in democracies

69 around the world, this study offers insights into when corruption scandals can change public  
70 perceptions of government.

### 71 **Corruption and Perceptions of Government Performance**

72 The public's perception of government performance constrains policymakers because  
73 voters in democracies, in theory, sanction poor-performing officials (Keane, 2009; Fearon,  
74 1999). However, voters face numerous challenges in reflecting on government performance and  
75 assigning blame in light of their personal experiences.

76 One challenge is that people tend to evaluate the government performance based on  
77 abstract national economic conditions, rather than their concrete personal circumstances (Kinder  
78 & Kiewiet, 1981; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). While the economy may serve as an  
79 important criterion, voters often fail to punish policymakers for personal grievances that poor  
80 government performance might have affected. For instance, when citizens see personal hardships  
81 (e.g., disaster-related household damages) as personal problems rather than inequalities that  
82 government is responsible for, they fail to hold the government accountable for policy failures  
83 (Sou, 2019). Despite this tendency, individuals can come to assess and judge politics based on  
84 personal grievances when personal stakes are salient and large (Compton & Lipsmeyer, 2019;  
85 Chong et al., 2001; Sears & Funk, 1991; Gerber et al., 2017). For example, individuals who lost  
86 income or jobs during national financial crises disapprove of and punish the incumbent  
87 government by shifting support to opposition parties (Anderson & Hecht 2012; Lewis-Beck &  
88 Paldam, 2000; Singer, 2018).

89 Even when national crises help clarify perceptions of government performance, a second  
90 obstacle can still bias perception: partisan reasoning. Partisan reasoning can obstruct individuals  
91 from properly assigning responsibility for political events (Kuo et al., 2017, Rico & Liñeira,

92 2018), economic crises (Bisgaard, 2015; Tilley & Hobolt, 2011). Furthermore, due to cognitive  
93 dissonance, people are predisposed to avoid blaming themselves or parties they are affiliated  
94 with (Tavris & Aronson, 2007). Although corruption scandals identify wrongdoers and are  
95 widely disliked, they still often go unpunished by the electorate (Chong et al., 2015; Ferraz &  
96 Finan, 2008), because partisan favoritism can attenuate negative assessment of corrupt behavior  
97 by co-partisans (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Charron & Bågenholm, 2016; Klačnja, 2017).

98         As a way to examine public perceptions of government performance, we focus on how  
99 individuals blame the government compared to themselves in light of corruption scandals.  
100 Compared to the prior literature that primarily relied on voting behavior, our approach enhances  
101 our understanding of how people assess government performance for the following reasons. One  
102 limit of voting as an assessment tool is that voting decisions often require weighing tradeoffs.  
103 For instance, voters face tradeoffs like choosing between a corrupt but competent candidate and  
104 a clean but incompetent candidate, sometimes leading them to vote for a corrupt candidate who  
105 can deliver on campaign promises (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013). These tradeoffs imply  
106 limits to capturing public reaction in vote choices, namely that the observed outcomes (voting)  
107 may not reflect voters' true assessment of a corrupt candidate (disapproval). Voting is a  
108 constrained means to capture varied public reactions because voters may perceive all candidates  
109 as corrupt (Agerberg, 2020) or perceive differences in severity of corruption (i.e., between  
110 bribery and campaign finance or by dollar amounts) (Peters & Welsch, 1980; Bågenholm &  
111 Charron, 2020). Moreover, survey respondents often express a greater willingness to punish  
112 corrupt incumbents than in their actual voting behavior, due to social desirability bias (Incerti,  
113 2020; Boas et. al., 2019). Blame, in contrast, does not ask individuals to make moral judgements  
114 on corrupt politicians. Because previous studies suggest that while individuals may dislike

115 corruption in abstract, they differ in how they assess the government in diverse ways beyond  
116 what voting can capture, our novel approach to measure the relative blame on the government  
117 versus self can enrich the literature by capturing varied responses to government performance.

### 118 **Corruption and Blame Attribution: The Role of Anxiety and Partisanship**

119 We propose that corruption scandals change how the public perceives the impact of  
120 government on their lives for the following reasons. Unlike economic issues where citizens often  
121 find it hard to identify whom to blame due to economic processes that are complex with  
122 competing causes and consequences (Powell & Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 2000), corruption  
123 scandals are straightforward. Moreover, parties are unified in their disapproval of corruption, and  
124 voters have clarity on whom to blame in a widely publicized corruption scandal (Ecker et al.,  
125 2016). Finally, corruption scandals involving nepotism imply inequality, which reduces public  
126 support for governing parties (Goubin et al., 2020), in contrast to corruption scandals centered on  
127 bribery, which voters may see as having positive externalities (Fernández-Vázquez et al., 2016).  
128 We focus on blame attribution because personal grievances related to major government policies  
129 will not change citizens' government assessments if individuals blame themselves (e.g., Baird &  
130 Wolak, 2021; Sou, 2019; Kinder & Mebane, 1983). We do not focus on voting decisions  
131 because those decisions are more constrained by tradeoffs (Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013).

132 Our theoretical approach builds on the literature on the limited role of personal concerns  
133 in how people assess the government. For instance, people tend think about the national  
134 economy rather than their personal circumstances when making voting decisions (Kinder &  
135 Mebane, 1983), and often consider issues related to wellbeing as private, rather than social  
136 political issues (Sou, 2019) unless personal stakes are large (Compton & Lipsmeyer, 2019;  
137 Singer, 2018; Chong et al., 2001). Considering this research, we explored corruption scandals

138 involving nepotism on three topics where stakes are large for most people at various points of  
139 their life: education, employment, and retirement. When people see lawmakers gaining an unfair  
140 advantage in these major life areas using their positions, we expect it will not only remind people  
141 of poor government performance but also trigger a feeling of unfairness and inequality (Goubin  
142 et al., 2020; Kim et al., 2018), ultimately causing individuals to connect their life grievances to  
143 the quality of political system and government performance. Thus, we expect individuals to  
144 blame government more for personal concerns upon learning about a corruption scandal  
145 featuring nepotism in the areas of major life concerns.

146 **H1:** Individuals will blame the government more as the cause of their personal concerns when  
147 exposed to a nepotism-style corruption scandal, relative to those who receive no information.

148 We also examine whether anxiety moderates the degree to which corruption scandals  
149 prompt individuals to blame the government. Anxiety increases individuals' responsiveness to  
150 new information when making decisions, proclivity to seek out additional information, and  
151 openness to adapting prior attitudes, including political decisions (Brader & Marcus, 2013;  
152 Gadarian & Albertson, 2013; Redlawsk et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2008). Thus, more worried  
153 individuals are likely to actively incorporate new information about corruption scandals in their  
154 evaluation of government compared to less worried individuals.

155 In order for anxiety to play an important role, it is crucial that individuals perceive new  
156 information as relevant to their own life, because anxiety may play a weaker role when  
157 individuals do not see new information as useful to their wellbeing (Valentino et al., 2008).

158 Thus, we propose that anxiety plays an important role when corruption scandals involve  
159 nepotism that highlights unequal opportunities in society. Furthermore, from the perspective of  
160 emotion regulation, anxiety is an aversive state that triggers individuals to adjust their

161 perceptions and behaviors to reduce anxiety (Gross, 1998; Huddy et al., 2021). Considering prior  
162 research, more worried individuals are likely to shift their perspectives. We argue that one  
163 potential way to lessen their emotional burden and manage anxiety can be to blame the  
164 government rather than blaming oneself. Thus, we expect individuals who are more worried  
165 about their personal hardships will be more responsive to corruption scandals when attributing  
166 blame to the government.

167 **H2:** Exposure to corruption scandals will increase blame attribution to the government as the  
168 cause of personal grievances to a greater extent among more worried individuals than less  
169 worried individuals.

170 We further explore how political predispositions, such as ideology or partisan identity,  
171 moderate the effects of corruption on blame attribution. These political predispositions often  
172 prevent people from assessing inferior performance by co-partisans (Bisgaard, 2015). Thus, one  
173 possibility is that corruption scandals increase government blame to a greater extent among  
174 partisans whose party is out of power. However, given the unique property of corruption as a  
175 political event that voters across party lines dislike (Ecker et al., 2016; Ares & Hernández, 2017),  
176 it is possible that nepotism-style corruption leads partisans whose party is in power to blame the  
177 government as the cause of their personal concerns, not just opposition partisans who may  
178 already be predisposed blame the incumbent. We thus explore whether corruption scandals  
179 influence government blame to a different extent depending on individuals' ideology or  
180 partisanship.

181 **RQ1:** Do corruption scandals increase government blame to a greater extent among partisans  
182 whose party is out of power than partisans whose party is in power?

183 **Case Selection: South Korea**

184           We examine the effects of corruption scandals on government blame attributions in the  
185 context of South Korea. South Korea has a long history of corruption among political elites in  
186 the form of collusion between government and business (Choi, 2018; Kong, 1996). Every former  
187 president from 1981 to the time of our survey were themselves or their direct family members  
188 investigated or charged with corruption related to embezzlement of public funds or bribery from  
189 conglomerates (Kalinowski, 2016). Corruption in South Korea is more focused on the elite level  
190 rather than at the mass level (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2017), with rare personal-level  
191 corruption (e.g., police bribery; Table S1 in supplementary materials).<sup>1</sup>

192           While studies suggest that electoral punishment of the incumbent is less likely in  
193 countries where corruption is common (Klašnja & Tucker, 2013), in 2016-2017, the South  
194 Korean public engaged in a series of protests that succeeded at impeaching former president Park  
195 Geun-hye for corruption (Campbell, 2016). Nation-wide protests lasted from November 2016 to  
196 March 2017 and Park's approval ratings hit a record-low of 4% (Klug et al., 2016), with people  
197 across party and ideological lines supporting her impeachment (Jeong, 2017). During the  
198 protests, many Koreans blamed the government for personal matters such as unequal education  
199 opportunities and employment instability (Jeong & Lee, 2016; Kim, 2016), counter to  
200 expectations that people tend to distance politics from their personal life concerns (Kinder &  
201 Kiewiet, 1981; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). The Korean public's broad reaction was also  
202 surprising considering prior findings that corruption scandals often fail to induce incumbent  
203 supporters to punish the incumbent government (Anduiza et al., 2013; Anderson & Tverdova,  
204 2003; Chong et al., 2015; Klašnja, 2017).

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<sup>1</sup> This puts South Korea in contrast with countries where first-hand experiences of bribery are more common (Pande, 2007; Klašnja et al., 2016).

205           In comparison to previous South Korean presidential corruption scandals, the public's  
206 reaction to the 2016-2017 scandal demonstrates the importance of narratives that reveal  
207 inequality on matters of primary importance for personal wellbeing in order for corruption to  
208 change the way people assess government culpability. While previous Korean presidential  
209 corruption scandals involved embezzlement of public funds or bribery from conglomerates  
210 (Kalinowski, 2016), a prominent feature of Park's scandal was that her confidant, Choi, used her  
211 influence to change the college admissions criteria at Ewha Women's University, one of the  
212 prestigious universities in South Korea, to have her daughter admitted (Ahn, 2017). This  
213 nepotism-style corruption fueled the already popular discussion of "gold spoon" versus "dirt  
214 spoon" (each referring to children of well-off and worse-off families respectively; Kim, 2017).  
215 The clear personal stake of inequality highlighted by nepotism prompted high school and college  
216 students to join protests (Jeong & Lee, 2016). Choi also used her influence to force donations  
217 from conglomerates and appoint her relatives of major governmental positions (Jeong & Lee,  
218 2016), another clear case of nepotism-style corruption. These issues around college admissions  
219 and preferential hiring further prompted citizens to consider the government culpable for  
220 aggravating hardships in their lives (Campbell, 2016). The Korean corruption scandal and  
221 impeachment are distinct from prior findings that corruption incidents have limited impact on  
222 opinion among co-partisans or even decrease political participation (Anduiza et al., 2013;  
223 Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Chong et al., 2013; Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013).

224           By focusing on South Korea, our study has broad implications for other developed  
225 countries, because it is typical, rather than an outlier, in terms of how the public perceives  
226 corruption, the role of government, and partisanship. South Koreans perceive a similar level of  
227 elite corruption or social inequality compared to other OECD countries (de Vries & Solaz, 2017;

228 Haerpfer et al., 2022; also see Figure S1),<sup>2</sup> and South Korea ranked 51st out of 180 countries in  
229 corruption rankings (Transparency International, 2017). While some might assume that Koreans  
230 hold collectivist views (Cha, 1994), South Korea was like other OECD countries in the degree to  
231 which respondents believe government is responsible for social welfare (Haerpfer et al., 2022;  
232 also see Figure S2). Finally, most South Koreans perceive their support for a party as an  
233 important social identity (Jang & Ha, 2022; Kim & Lee, 2021), despite Korean parties frequently  
234 changing their party labels (Han, 2019). Therefore, we expect that our findings can elucidate  
235 under what conditions voters blame government in a range of other democracies.

### 236 **Study Design**

237 To test how corruption scandals affect blame attribution to the government for personal  
238 grievances, we conducted a survey experiment among an online sample of 1,185 adults in South  
239 Korea between November 21-23, 2018. Participants were recruited through the Macromill  
240 Embrain, an online panel of South Koreans used in numerous studies (e.g., Lee et al., 2018;  
241 Jeong et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2018). The survey firm applied quotas on gender, age, and region,  
242 resulting in a diverse, albeit not perfectly nationally representative, sample (details in Tables S7,  
243 S9).

### 244 **Experimental Treatments**

245 Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions, which consisted of a  
246 baseline and three treatment conditions. In the treatment conditions, participants were exposed to  
247 text reporting a recent nepotism-style corruption scandal by Congresspeople who gained an  
248 advantage for their relatives on issues highly relevant to personal life—college admission,  
249 preferential hiring, or elderly care benefits. We drafted the stimuli texts to reflect recent Korean

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<sup>2</sup> The World Values Survey Wave 7 was fielded in 2018 in South Korea.

250 corruption scandals (Denyer & Kim, 2018; Hong, 2018; Lee, 2018, Yoon, 2018) and to be  
 251 parallel across treatment conditions. All treatments consider nepotism specifically, rather than  
 252 other types of corruption. Because source cues may affect the degree to which individuals trust  
 253 the allegations of corruption (Weitz-Shapiro & Winters, 2017), we intentionally did not ascribe  
 254 the story to any specific source. The baseline condition did not receive any text, allowing us to  
 255 estimate the base level of blame attribution to government or self as the cause of personal  
 256 concerns.

257 **Table 1**

258 *Content of Experimental Stimuli*

Area of Corruption	Content
College Admission	In October 2017, ten congresspeople were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in <b>the admission process of universities</b> . It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were admitted to prestigious universities without going through the appropriate process.
Preferential Hiring	In October 2017, ten congresspeople were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in <b>the employment process of companies</b> . It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were employed at large companies without going through the appropriate process.
Elderly Care	In October 2017, ten congresspeople were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in <b>the selection process for beneficiaries of a new national elderly care center</b> . It was found that elderly parents of politicians and high government officials were admitted to the institute without going through the appropriate process.
Baseline	<i>[No text]</i>

259 *Note.* None of the text was bolded in the actual study. In each experimental condition, half of the  
 260 participants were randomly assigned to the text above, with the added sentence, “In consequence,  
 261 many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.” This variation was implemented for

262 another dimension of experimental design (competition cue), which was collapsed into the  
263 corruption area conditions in the main analyses (more details in Tables S5-S6).

#### 264 **Measurement**

265         The main outcome variable is the degree to which individuals blame government as the  
266 cause of their personal concerns. On the screen immediately following the experimental  
267 treatment, participants indicated the degree to which either the government or themselves was  
268 responsible as the cause of their personal concerns in education, employment, and retirement  
269 respectively. They expressed their perception on a five-point scale that ranged from “the  
270 government is completely responsible,” “the government is somewhat responsible,” “equally  
271 responsible,” “I myself am somewhat responsible,” to “I myself am completely responsible.” To  
272 clarify, the question elaborated that “*government* broadly refers to politicians, central and local  
273 governments, government’s relationship with Cheobol system, and government’s management of  
274 economy,” whereas “*myself* broadly refers to [the respondent’s] educational background,  
275 family’s financial condition, degree of ambition and effort, and personal choices.” The key  
276 outcome variable is the composite score, averaging blame attribution to government over self on  
277 the three topics, though our analysis also explores topic-specific blame.

278         Immediately prior to the experimental treatment, we measured the degree of anxiety by  
279 asking respondents to indicate how much they were worried, on a five-point scale ranging from  
280 “not at all worried” to “extremely worried,” about themselves, their spouse, parent, and children  
281 on three areas of their personal life: education, employment, and retirement/aging. The key  
282 measure of anxiety is the composite score, constructed as an average, of anxiety about *self* across  
283 the three topics. Because individuals may conflate their anxiety about themselves and their  
284 family members, our goal was to measure the degree of anxiety about personal life concerns in a

285 manner that was comparable across respondents with different family backgrounds. While  
286 anxiety can be measured with a multi-item battery using cognates (e.g., “scared,” “worried,”  
287 “afraid”; Marcus et al. 2017), for efficiency and to prevent respondent fatigue, our measure  
288 focused on “worried,” the anxiety term most relevant to the context of our study.

289 To measure partisan identity, we used a two-step questionnaire in the beginning of the  
290 survey that first asked whether respondents identified with a specific party, and then asked either  
291 the strength of support (if one party was chosen in the previous question) or a preferred party (if  
292 no party was selected). South Korea has a multi-party system with two major parties that tend to  
293 alternate power. The list of parties included five parties prominent at the time of our study: two  
294 major parties—Democratic Party of Korea (DPK, liberal) and Liberty Korea Party (LKP,  
295 conservative)—and three minor parties—Justice Party (progressive), Bareun Party  
296 (conservative), and Party for Democracy and Peace (Peace, liberal). Considering partisan leaners  
297 as partisans (Petrocik, 2009), our sample included 890 partisans, with the majority being strong  
298 partisans (68% of incumbent partisans (DPK), 62% of opposition partisans), and 290 pure  
299 independents (details in Table S8). For ideology, respondents placed themselves on a seven-point  
300 scale from “very conservative” to “very liberal.”

## 301 **Results**


### 302 **Descriptive Results: Anxiety about Everyday Life**

303 The distribution of anxiety about education, employment, and retirement, in addition to  
304 our qualitative analysis of the open-ended responses confirm our assumption that these are areas  
305 of serious and widespread concern in South Korea. When asked to indicate how much  
306 respondents were worried about the challenges in their own life, many expressed anxiety across  
307 multiple aspects, as shown in Figure 1. More than half of the participants expressed more than a

308 moderate amount of anxiety (“moderately,” “very,” and “extremely” worried) for all three areas  
 309 (Education: 70%, Employment: 79%, Retirement: 92%). Respondents were the most worried  
 310 about retirement (77% indicated “very” or “extremely” worried) and least worried about  
 311 education (only 39% indicated “very” or “extremely” worried).

### 312 **Figure 1**

313 *Degree of Anxiety about Education, Employment, and Retirement*



314  
 315 After indicating the level of anxiety, participants described their personal concerns about  
 316 each topic. Table 2 summarizes the themes found in open-ended responses, which reveal that  
 317 individuals have substantive personal concerns across all three topics. Supplementary materials  
 318 provide further details about methods and frequently mentioned words (Figure S4), and  
 319 additional examples of open-ended responses by themes (Tables S2-S4).

### 320 **Table 2**

321 *Open-ended Descriptions of Personal Concerns*

Topic	Theme	Example
Education	Education costs and competition	As a working mother who must send my children to daycare, I am most worried about the lack of kindergarten and private daycare. (ID388)
	Additional educational needs	I worry if I need to get additional education to keep up with the rapidly changing environments (ID908)
	Unequal opportunities	Economic inequalities are resulting in unequal opportunities in educational benefits. I worry if I can properly educate my future child without discrimination. (ID916)

	Threat of unemployment	Whether my company would fire me or impose any disadvantages due to the bad economy (ID933)
Employment	Unstable employment for at-will limited-term employees	There is so much corruption about employment, so it is very difficult to be released from the fate of being an at-will limited term employee. (ID368)
	Decreasing retirement age, Mid-age job seeking	I worry that my company would force me to resign. (ID923)
Retirement	Lack of retirement funds & Increasing life expectancy	Given the increasing average life expectancy... I am worried about retirement funds that aren't completely ready for the years after my retirement. (ID81)
	Insufficient national pension	A lot of living expenses are required after retirement, but in reality the national pension system is not satisfactory enough to support the need. (ID1205)
	Cost of health care	Anxiety about the cost of living after retirement and the burden of increasing living and medical expenses due to aging. (ID382)
	Uncertainties about life after retirement	I worry how I should concretely plan for life after retirement, and how I could live a long, healthy life. (ID1319)

322           When asked about concerns related to *education*, many respondents with children  
323 mentioned the costs associated with education and private tutoring, increasing competition  
324 around private education, their children's college admissions, and the lack of daycare. Other  
325 recurring themes included whether they would pursue a higher degree, get additional training,  
326 and unequal opportunities due to income or regional differences. Of the three topics, education  
327 had the highest rate of non-response, where 14% of respondents left the question blank or  
328 claimed they did not have any concerns.

329           Regarding *employment*, respondents were primarily worried with the current state of the  
330 labor market, the ability to work in their old age, and the stability and working conditions under  
331 their current employment (e.g., at-will limited-term employment, pressured early retirement).  
332 Concerns about working later in life are centered around involuntary early retirement and

333 decreasing retirement age, leading many respondents to be worried about the growing number of  
334 middle-aged job seekers in a tight labor market. Only 7% of respondents indicated no concerns.


335         When thinking about *retirement and aging*, respondents were primarily worried about not  
336 having enough funds during retirement and the cost of health care. Many respondents believed  
337 Korea's pension system would be insolvent before they reached retirement age. Other recurring  
338 concerns included the need to prepare for increasing life expectancy and a lack of planning.  
339 Sometimes retirement-related concerns were linked to concerns about employment. Of the three  
340 topics, respondents were most concerned about retirement and aging: only 2% of respondents  
341 indicated no concerns.

#### 342 **Experimental Results: The Effects of Exposure to Corruption Stories**

343         The results from the experiment demonstrate that corruption scandals involving nepotism  
344 in the areas of major life concerns increase the degree to which individuals blame the  
345 government for personal grievances. Figure 2 illustrates the effects of corruption scandals on  
346 blame attribution to government rather than self. For Figure 2A, the outcome variable is overall  
347 blame, the composite score of blame attributions on three areas of life, education, employment,  
348 and retirement (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .74$ ), where higher values indicate greater blame to government  
349 and lower values indicate greater blame to self as the cause of personal concerns. Supplementary  
350 materials present OLS regression models with robust standard errors that estimate the average  
351 treatment effects of each experimental treatment—exposure to a story about a corruption scandal  
352 regarding college admission, preferential hiring, and elderly care respectively—compared to no  
353 exposure to such information (control condition) (Tables S10-S13).

#### 354 **Figure 2**

355 *Corruption Scandal Effects on Blame Attribution: Overall and Topic-Specific*



356

357 *Note:* Mean and 95% confidence interval of government-self blame by experimental conditions.

358 *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of

359 personal concerns, ranging from 0 (greater self-blame) to 1 (greater government-blame). Table

360 S11 (column 1) and Table S12 present these results in tabular form.

361 The treatment effects on overall blame, shown in Figure 2A, partially support H1, which

362 predicted that nepotism-style corruption will increase government blame as the cause of personal

363 concerns. We find that corruption stories related to college admission (0.04,  $p < .05$ ) and elderly

364 care (0.03,  $p < .10$ ) increased blame attribution to the government compared to the baseline,

365 while preferential hiring corruption had an insignificant, positive effect. Given that our theory

366 focuses on personal relevancy of corruption scandals, stronger treatment effects of college  
367 admission corruption (respondents were the least worried about education) and negligible effects  
368 of preferential hiring is surprising. One explanation is that individual perceptions of corruption  
369 scandals could vary depending on the specific nature and topic, generating different reactions of  
370 blame. For instance, corruption in college admission or elderly care benefits may be seen as  
371 more upsetting, unfair, or personally relevant compared to scandals on preferential hiring.

372         Because each treatment condition involved corruption scandals where politicians used  
373 their positions for nepotism on three distinct topics, we further examined topic-specific blame  
374 attribution. Figures 2B-2D show treatment effects on blaming the government as the cause of  
375 personal concerns *on each topic* separately.

376         As shown in Figure 2B, compared to the baseline, blame for the government specifically  
377 for education concerns increased upon learning about college admission corruption (0.08,  $p$   
378  $< .01$ ) or elderly care corruption (0.05,  $p < .02$ ). Interestingly, a corruption scandal on *elderly*  
379 *care* prompted people to attribute greater blame to the government on *education* concerns,  
380 implying a potential link between elderly care corruption and blame for education. This finding  
381 demonstrates that corruption scandals on certain topics can spill over to blame for other topics as  
382 well. Blame for retirement and employment concerns (Figures 2C, 2D), in contrast, were  
383 minimally affected by corruption treatments. College admission corruption had a marginally  
384 significant effect on employment-specific blame (0.03,  $p = .11$ ), again indicating a potential  
385 spillover effect of corruption on blame across topics. These results suggest the treatment effects  
386 in Figure 2A are largely driven by blame for education concerns.


387         Next, we examine H2, which expected that exposure to corruption scandal would prompt  
388 more worried individuals to blame government to a greater extent compared to less worried ones.

389 To test H2, we examined treatment effects by subgroups of low versus high levels of preexisting  
390 anxiety. To categorize individuals into low and high levels of anxiety, we used the median split  
391 of the composite score of anxiety on the three areas of life: education, employment, and  
392 retirement/aging ( $\alpha = .71$ , median = 0.67). The median split approach is appropriate because the  
393 median split variable (anxiety) and the experimental treatments are orthogonal and we intend to  
394 investigate group differences rather than individual heterogeneity (Iacobucci et al., 2015).  
395 Consistent with H2, the effects of corruption scandals on blame attribution were greater among  
396 more worried individuals.

397 As indicated in Figure 3A, among more worried individuals, all three types of nepotism-  
398 style corruption increased the overall blame to government: college admission (0.07,  $p < .01$ ),  
399 preferential hiring (0.06,  $p < .05$ ), and elderly care (0.04,  $p < .10$ ). In contrast, less worried  
400 individuals were minimally affected by all types of corruption: college admission (0.01, *ns*),  
401 preferential hiring (-0.01, *ns*), elderly care (0.02, *ns*).

402 **Figure 3**

403 *Corruption Scandal Effects on Area-specific Blame Attribution by Degree of Anxiety*



404

405 *Note:* Mean and 95% confidence interval of government-self blame by experimental conditions.406 *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of

407 personal concerns, ranging from 0 (greater self-blame) to 1 (greater government-blame). Table

408 S11 (columns 2, 3) and Table S13 present these results in tabular form.

409 When we consider topic-specific blame, the moderating role of anxiety is more

410 pronounced for blame attribution on education- and employment-related concerns than blame for

411 retirement concerns. Among more worried individuals, exposure to a corruption story

412 significantly increased blame towards government as the cause of education-related concerns

413 (college admission: 0.12,  $p < .01$ , preferential hiring: 0.8,  $p < .01$ , elderly care: 0.9,  $p < .01$ ), but

414 had minimal impact among less worried individuals (Figure 3B). Likewise, exposure to  
415 corruption scandals prompted more worried individuals to blame the government more as the  
416 cause of their employment-related concerns (college admission: 0.06,  $p < .05$ ; preferential hiring:  
417 0.07,  $p < .05$ ; elderly care: 0.05,  $p < .10$ ), but had minimal impacts on less worried individuals  
418 (Figure 3C).

419         Among more worried individuals, the topic-specific government blame increased the  
420 most when the corruption scandal involved the relevant topic. For instance, blame to the  
421 government for education concerns increased the most under the college admission corruption  
422 treatment, compared to other corruption treatments (Figure 3B). Similarly, employment-specific  
423 government blame increased the most under the preferential hiring corruption treatment,  
424 compared to other corruption cases (Figure 3C). Additionally, similar to the findings in Figure 2,  
425 corruption scandals on a specific topic can spill over to blame for the other concern areas among  
426 worried individuals. *Preferential hiring* corruption led people to blame the government as the  
427 cause of their *education* concerns, and *elderly care* corruption led people to blame the  
428 government as the cause of their *employment* concerns.


429         The results on both H1 and H2 indicate weaker effects of corruption scandals on  
430 retirement-specific blame. These findings could be due to the already high degree of government  
431 culpability for retirement concerns in the baseline. For instance, in Figure 2, under the control  
432 condition, retirement-related blame (0.63) is higher than education- or employment-related  
433 blame (both 0.60), although these differences were statistically insignificant. This gap becomes  
434 even greater among more worried individuals. In Figure 3, under the control condition,  
435 government blame for retirement was much higher (0.67) compared to that for education (0.60)  
436 or employment (0.60), with statistically significant differences (retirement vs. education:  $t =$

437 2.08,  $p < .05$ ; retirement vs. employment:  $t = 2.02$ ,  $p < .05$ ).<sup>3</sup> These results imply that individuals  
 438 already blame government more for retirement concerns compared to other concerns.

439 We also examined whether exposure to corruption scandals would increase government  
 440 blame to a lesser extent among partisans who support the incumbent government compared to  
 441 opposing partisans (RQ1). At the time of our study, a liberal party (DPK) was in power. As  
 442 shown in Figure 4A, conservatives and liberals were similar in the degree of blame absent  
 443 corruption scandals under the control condition ( $t = 0.96$ ,  $p = .34$ ; conservatives = 0.64, liberals =  
 444 0.61). Exposure to corruption scandals prompted liberals to blame to the government to a greater  
 445 extent, particularly when corruption scandals were about college admission (0.04,  $p < .10$ ) or  
 446 elderly care benefits (0.05,  $p < .10$ ). Conservatives, whose party was out of power, were  
 447 minimally affected by exposure to corruption scandals.

#### 448 **Figure 4**

449 *Corruption Scandal Effects on Blame Attribution by Ideology and Partisanship*



450

<sup>3</sup> Interestingly, in the baseline in Figure 3, more and less worried individuals blamed the government for education and employment concerns to a similar extent (for both, more worried: 0.60, less worried: 0.59, differences not statistically significant), whereas more worried individuals blamed the government more (0.67) than less worried individuals (0.57) for retirement concerns ( $t = 2.9$ ,  $p < .01$ ).

451           *Note:* Mean and 95% confidence interval of government-self blame attribution by  
452 experimental conditions. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government  
453 or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 0 (greater self-blame) to 1 (greater  
454 government-blame). Table S14 presents these results in tabular form.

455           We find a similar pattern with respect to partisan identity. In the baseline, partisans who  
456 identify with the incumbent party (DPK) blamed the government to a similar extent as opposition  
457 partisans—including LKP, Justice, Bareun, and Peace ( $t = 1.20, p = .23$ ; incumbent partisans =  
458 0.60, opposition partisans = 0.64). When exposed to corruption scandals, incumbent partisans  
459 blamed government more especially when the corruption involved college admission ( $0.05, p$   
460  $< .05$ ), but the treatment minimally affected opposition partisans. The treatment effects were  
461 similarly negligible among partisans of the major opposition party (LKP)<sup>4</sup> exclusively (Table  
462 S15), illustrating that incumbent partisans tend to be more responsive to corruption scandals than  
463 others.

464           These results show that corruption scandals more strongly prompted supporters rather  
465 than opponents of the incumbent government to attribute greater blame to government. These  
466 findings are surprising considering prior studies that highlight in-group favoritism as an obstacle  
467 to properly holding the government accountable. For instance, prior research shows that partisans  
468 support their own party despite poor performance and instead blame opposition administrations  
469 (e.g., Kuo et al, 2017; Tilley & Hobolt, 2011). However, during extraordinary events like  
470 recessions (Bisgaard, 2015), incumbent and opposition supporters share their assessment of  
471 government performance, but differ in who to blame. Our findings add to this literature by

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<sup>4</sup> LKP was the party of President Park Geun-hye who was impeached in 2017.

472 showing that nepotism-style corruption scandals can trigger incumbent supporters—who are  
473 otherwise unlikely to blame the incumbent government—to blame the government more.

474 We additionally examined whether demographic traits moderate the treatment effects.  
475 There was no statistically significant difference in treatment effects by age, education, and  
476 income groups. Consistent with prior findings that females tend to be more punitive to corruption  
477 than males (Alexander et al., 2020), we found greater treatment effects among females than  
478 males, particularly given college admission corruption.

479 These findings are meaningful in explaining why the 2016 corruption scandal was  
480 explosive enough to generate nation-wide protests and bipartisan support for the presidential  
481 impeachment in South Korea. Corruption scandals can cause individuals to reassess their  
482 perception of government culpability, particularly among more worried individuals and  
483 incumbent partisans (DPK in this study). The 2016 corruption scandal in South Korea involved  
484 nepotism in college admissions and employment (Ahn, 2017; Jeong & Lee, 2016), which are the  
485 types of corruption that powerfully increased government blame in this study. During the months  
486 culminating to the presidential impeachment in 2017, eight out ten Koreans supported the  
487 presidential impeachment between December 2016 and February 2017 (Koh, 2017), even  
488 including Koreans who previously supported the incumbent government (LKP) (e.g., 58% of  
489 Koreans living in the Park’s stronghold regions supported her impeachment; Jeong, 2017). Our  
490 findings suggest that corruption scandals can trigger individuals to reconsider their perceptions  
491 around government responsibility and performance, particularly among more worried individuals  
492 and even among incumbent partisans.

493 **Discussion**

494           This study deepens our understanding of how people connect to and understand national  
495 political events. Our findings indicate that corruption scandals that feature nepotism in areas of  
496 everyday concern can prompt people to blame government as the cause of their personal  
497 concerns. Anxiety can reinforce the effect because corruption scandals more strongly affect  
498 highly worried individuals to blame the government more for personal hardships. To our  
499 knowledge, this is one of the first attempts in the literature to examine how anxiety and  
500 government blame are related. Notably, corruption scandals can lead partisans to blame  
501 government more even when their own party is in power.

502           This study demonstrates that corruption scandals can have broader impacts beyond  
503 whether the individual implicated in the scandal is re-elected. Findings from our study show that  
504 corruption scandals may change the way that individuals relate their personal issues with the  
505 government and affect politics far beyond the re-election of a single person or party, which has  
506 been the focus of much of the corruption literature. Additionally, we apply existing literature  
507 around the impact of economic crises on blame and voting behavior to explore another type of  
508 extraordinary time in politics: corruption scandals. Corruption scandals, like economic  
509 downturns, are disliked across party lines (Klašnja et al., 2021) but are far easier to comprehend  
510 and therefore have a clearer pathway for blame attribution.

511           Like any other studies, ours has several limitations. First, the sample for this study was  
512 recruited via an online survey platform and tends to be younger and more educated than the  
513 general population. Future research could test the extent to which our findings generalize.  
514 Second, our experiment lacked partisan labels for the wrongdoers and source cues (e.g., news  
515 outlet), which future studies may investigate. Third, our study focused on a narrow set of  
516 corruption scandals that highlighted nepotism related to common areas of concern, so future

517 work could explore if these findings replicate among other types of corruption scandals related to  
518 issues of high social concern (e.g., bribery in infrastructure, siphoning money from educational  
519 initiatives, or misuse of pension funds). Finally, future studies could explore the behavioral  
520 implications of changes in perceptions of government culpability.

521         This study has several implications for our understanding of politics. We find corruption  
522 scandals are powerful motivators for people to blame government for poor performance. Political  
523 entrepreneurs and opposition groups may successfully capitalize on corruption scandals by  
524 making the connection between high profile corruption and the everyday personal concerns that  
525 people care about.<sup>5</sup> Our findings suggest that these appeals will be the most potent when more  
526 people are worried (e.g., economic recessions, national crises) or among individuals who are at  
527 moments of high anxiety in their life (e.g., entering the job market, approaching retirement).  
528 These appeals can also be impactful among incumbent supporters who are otherwise disinclined  
529 to blame the incumbent government. Blame can have important downstream effects on  
530 democracies as it can trigger anger and political mobilization, especially among individuals with  
531 personal hardships (Aytaç et al., 2020). Ultimately, nepotism-style corruption scandals have the  
532 potential to enable widespread bipartisan opposition to the incumbent government, like the 2016-  
533 2017 protest movement against the presidential corruption scandal in South Korea.

534 **Data Accessibility Statement:** We will make our data, code, and study materials available  
535 through an Open Science Framework link upon publication of this paper. This study was not  
536 preregistered.

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<sup>5</sup>Alexei Navalny, an opposition leader in Russia, was credited with using corruption scandals to motivate people to blame Russian authoritarians for their personal concerns. (Navalny, 2021)

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## Supplementary Materials

*for*

### Can Corruption Connect You to Politics?

#### The Effects of Corruption Scandals on Blaming the Government for Personal Concerns

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
## South Korea in Perspective

### 1) Comparison with OECD Countries: Corruption and Government Responsibility

Figures S1-S2 illustrate the public perception of corruption and the role of government among the South Korean public in comparison to other OECD countries featured in the World Values Survey Wave 7 (Haerpfer et al., 2022). The public perceptions of the relative responsibility of the government compared to self and the prevalence of corruption among South Koreans tend towards the average among OECD countries. This implies that among these OECD countries, South Korea is a typical case, not an outlier, in terms of how the public assesses the government's role and corruption.

**Figure S1**


*Public perception of the prevalence of corruption*



*Note:* Q112 of the World Values Survey: “Now I’d like you to tell me your views on corruption – when people pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favor to other people in order to get the things they need done or the services they need. How would you place your views on corruption in [your country] on a 10-point scale where “1” means “there is no corruption in [my country]” and “10” means “there is abundant corruption in [my country].” If your views are somewhat mixed, choose the appropriate number in between.”

**Figure S2**

*Public perception of the responsibility of government versus individual*



*Note:* Q108 of the World Values Survey: “Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement [The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for]; 10 means you agree completely with the statement [People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves]; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.”

## 2) Personal-level Corruption Experiences

Table S1 shows that corruption at the personal level is very rare among South Koreans. Approximately more than nine out of ten South Koreans were never involved in each type of personal-level corruption. According to Figure S3, more than 75% of South Koreans have never experienced any personal-level corruption in their lifetime. These results imply corruption is likely to be conceived as elite-level phenomena among South Koreans, different from some other countries, such as Brazil or India, where personal-level corruption is more rampant (Pande, 2007).

**Table S1**


*Proportion of having personal-level corruption experiences*

Types of personal bribery	% (No)
I was personally asked for bribes by police.	94.4
I was personally asked for bribes by government officer (bureaucrat).	93.8
I was asked for bribes at work.	92.6
I was asked for bribes at school.	88.1
I was asked for bribes at hospital.	98.0

*Note.* Percent of “No” responses to the question “Have you ever experienced the following in your life?” (Yes/No).

**Figure S3**

*Distribution of the number of personal-level corruption experiences*





### 3) Examples of Open-Ended Responses by Themes

Tables S2-S4 show examples of open-ended responses for various themes identified for each area of concern. To create the list of open-ended responses that represent each theme, we initially used a random number generator to pull responses from the entire list (included both translated and non-translated responses) of respondent's unique IDs (n=1,186). These randomly chosen original responses were translated into English and included in these tables. In order to include a variety of substantive responses, we also manually read the original open-ended responses to supplement the list with additional responses that best characterized the variety of concerns for that category.

**Table S2**

*Open-ended responses by themes: Education*

Theme	ID	Korean (original)	English (translated)
Education costs and competition	55	부담되는 사교육비 비싼 등록금	Heavy costs of private education and expensive tuition
	138	사교육 심화와 자녀의 대학 입시에 대한 걱정	Worried about the increasing need for private education and my children's college admissions
	224	아이가 없어서 걱정거리가 현재는 없는 편이나, 현재의 유치원 사태나 대학입시 같은 문제가 향후에도 지속될지 걱정임	Because I don't have children, I don't have much to worry about at the moment, but I'm worried whether the current kindergarten crisis and college admission problems would continue in the future.
	388	유치원 대란으로 인해 피해보고 있는 아이들과 직장맘으로서 아이를 맡겨야하는데 유치원과 민간어린이집이 너무 적어 걱정이 가장 큼니다.	I am worried about kids who are disadvantaged due to the lack of kindergarten. As a working mother who must send my children to daycare, I am most worried about the lack of kindergarten and private daycare.
	616	너무 경쟁적이고 사교육이 심하다.. 공교육 위주의 교육이 필요 하다	It is too competitive and there is too much private education. We need to focus more on public education.
	953	자녀교육문제로 대학진로 문제로 걱정	I am worried about my children's education and which universities they would attend
	1079	교육비는 많이 들고 아이들도 공부하느라 고생하는데 대학 들어가는 점점 힘들고... 걱정이 많다	It costs a lot of money for my children's education, and my kids are struggling with learning, yet it's getting even more difficult to get into college, so I am worried a lot.
Additional educational needs	389	적성에 맞고 취업걱정없는 학과를 선택하기를 바라지만 조율하기 힘들	I want to choose a major that suits my aptitude and ensures me a job, but it is hard to reconcile the two

	397	학교교육과 사회생활은 별개로 취업공부를 다시 해야하는 실정이 안타깝고 비현실적이다	It is very concerning and unrealistic that I need to additionally study for job seeking, separate from school education and building career.
	908	급변하는 시대에 맞춰서 다양한 추가교육을 받아야 하지 않을까 하는 걱정	I worry if I need to get additional education to keep up with the rapidly changing environments
	909	대학원 진학을 고려해야 하는지에 관한 고민	I am concerned whether I should consider studying for a graduate degree
	970	자격증 및 영어등으로 고민을하고있다	I am concerned about getting more licenses and my English ability
	998	교육을 조금 더 받고 싶은데, 형편상 그렇지 못해 아쉽습니다	I wish to get more education, but I regret that I cannot due to personal circumstances
Unequal opportunities	821	평생 교육으로서 근처에서 마땅히 배울게 없고 비용 또한 비싸다.	There are not many things to learn for lifelong education around me and they cost a lot of money.
	916	경제적 불균형이 교육 혜택의 불균형으로 이어지고 있다. 과연 아이를 낳아 차별없이 올바르게 교육할 수 있을지 걱정이다.	Economic inequalities are resulting in unequal opportunities in educational benefits. I am worried if I can properly educate my future child without discrimination.
	1052	지방의 교육프로그램 부족 및 수준미달	Lack of education programs and the low quality of those programs in the regions outside Seoul

**Table S3***Open-ended responses by themes: Employment*

Theme	ID	Korean (original)	English (translated)
Threat of unemployment	599	취업해서 일해야 하는데 요즘 일자리가 많이 없는편이다. 만약 지금 다니는 직장에서 퇴사하면 다시 일자리를 구할수 있을지. 급여는 만족하게 받을수 있을지가 걱정입니다.	I need to get a job, but there are not many jobs these days. I am worried whether I'd be able to get a new job after quitting my current job and whether I'd be able to have satisfactory income.
	637	경력단절로 인한 재취업	Getting a new job after career interruption
	933	경제가 안좋아서 직장에서 해고당하거나 그 밖에 불이익 등	Whether my company would fire me or impose any disadvantages due to the bad economy
Unstable employment for at-will limited-term employees	108	계약직의 고용불안. 결혼 후 구직활동	Anxiety about stable employment because I'm a contract worker. Also worried about job seeking after getting married.

	368	정규직의 자리는 점점 줄어가고, 계약직으로 돌리고 돌리는 자리에 있다가 정규직으로 변경 되는건 하늘에 별따기인 요즘.. 취업비리도 너무 많고 일하고 싶어도 계약직이라는 굴레에서 벗어나기가 정말 힘들다고 생각합니다. 거기에 여성으로서 출산과 육아에 치이다 보면 자기 개발을 할 시간은 꿈꾸기도 어렵습니다.	There are fewer and fewer regular/permanent jobs, I've been at a position that continuously rotated being a contract worker, so it's extremely rare to get a regular position these days. Also there is so much corruption about employment, so it is very difficult to be released from the fate of being an at-will limited term employee. Moreover, as a female worker, I am bound by childbirth and childcare, so it is beyond my dream to find time for self-development.
Decreasing retirement age, Mid-age job seeking	648	남은 수명에 비해 수입이 언제까지 일정하게 들어올수 있는지가 걱정이다	I am worried about how long I will be able to have consistent income throughout the rest of my life.
	888	요즘 은퇴시기가 빨라지면서 언제 회사를 관둬야 할지 모른다는 불안감. 퇴사후 다른곳으로 취업이 가능할까하는 불안감. 늦게 아이를 낳은만큼 아이가 성인이 될때까지 고용유지가 될까하는 불안감.	Anxiety about the possibility that I might need resign my current job because the retirement age is decreasing these days. Worried whether I could get a new job after the resignation. I had my child late, so I am worried if I could have a stable job until my child becomes an adult.
	923	명예퇴직 당하지 않을까 걱정된다	I worry that my company would force me to resign ( <i>voluntary resignation</i> )
	1007	60 세 이후 까지 계속 직업을 갖고 경제적으로 안정되게 살 수 있을지 염려가 된다	I am concerned whether I'll be able to have a job even after 60 and continue to live an economically stable life.

**Table S4**  
*Open-ended responses by themes: Retirement*

Theme	ID	Korean (original)	English (translated)
Lack of retirement funds & Increasing life expectancy	81	평균수명은 늘어나는 현실에...은퇴후에 제대로 갖춰지지않은 노후자금이 고민이다	Given the increasing average life expectancy... I am worried about the retirement funds that aren't completely ready for the years after my retirement.
	138	은퇴에 따른 노후 대책화 고령화로 인한 건강 문제 등	Making plans for my old age after retirement, health concerns due to aging, etc.
	911	은퇴 후 노후자금 부족 등을 겪지 않을까 걱정임	I am worried about experiencing the shortage of retirement funds after my retirement
	1247	저도 걱정이긴 하지만 부모님이 더 걱정하시고 계십니다..곧 은퇴는 다가오는데 모아놓은 돈이 없어서 걱정이 많으십니다..	I'm worried about myself too, but my parents are more worried.. Their retirement is coming soon, but they

			haven't accumulated much money, so they are very worried.
Insufficient national pension	384	물가는 너무높고 국민연금에 의존해서는 생활이 안되지않나... 좋은자식 좋은부모가 되기위해 나의 은퇴후의 모습은 상상도 할수없다	Cost of living is too high and it wouldn't be feasible to afford living expenses only by relying on the national pension. To be a good child and good parent, I can't even imagine my life after retirement.
	508	국민연금 고갈 될거라는 불안감과 그다지개선되지 않는 생활수준 가파르게 오르는 물가 점점 벌어지는 빈부격차로 인한 상대적인 박탈감으로 점점더 불안해지는 노령 시기이다	Anxiety that the national pension system will be depleted and the status of living that isn't getting better. I am getting even more worried in my old age due to the sense of relative deprivation coming from the steep inflation and increasing gap between the rich and the poor.
	1205	은퇴 후 필요한 생활자금이 많으며, 국민연금이 이를 뒷받침해 주기에는 만족스럽지는 못한 실정. 고령화로 인해 내 자녀가 내야하는 세금걱정	A lot of living expenses are required after retirement, but in reality the national pension system is not satisfactory enough to support the need. I am also worried about the tax that my children should pay due to the aging society
Cost of health care	382	은퇴 후 생활비에 대한 걱정과 고령화에 따른 생활비 및 의료비 지출 증가에 따른 부담	Anxiety about the cost of living after retirement and the burden of increasing living and medical expenses due to aging
	1085	본인과 배우자의 경우는 점점 나이가 들면서 나빠지는 건강문제와 더불어 은퇴후 노후생활의 안정여부문제, 노후 의료자금문제등이 가장 걱정거리이며, 부모님의 경우 노인 치매나 갑작스런 질병등으로 인한 입원 수술로 의료비와 간병문제가 가장 걱정이 된다	For myself and my spouse, I'm worried about the health that is getting worse as we get older and the stability of our life and health care costs after retirement. For our parents, I'm most concerned about health care costs and health care services that might incur due to dementia or surgery due to sudden illness.
Uncertainties about the life after retirement	1258	그동안 자식들을 키우면서 노후 준비가 미흡한 상태이다. 아직 젊은 나이지만, 곧 은퇴를 다가와서 이후의 계획을 제대로 생각하지 못했다.	While raising my kids, I haven't been able to prepare for my retirement. Although I'm still in my youth, retirement is coming up soon, so I haven't been able to think about my plan after then.
	1319	노후준비에 대해서 구체적으로 어떻게 설계해야할지, 건강하게 오래잘지낼수있을지 고민합니다.	I worry how I should concretely plan for my life after retirement, and how I could live a long, healthy life.

## Experimental Design

### 1) Effects of Competition Cue on Government Blame

We originally designed this study to be a 3 by 2 experimental design: the area of corruption (3 topics: college admission, preferential hiring, elderly care) and the explicitness of competition (2 variations: explicit, implicit), in addition to control condition. We expected that competitive framing of corruption as a zero-sum competition between elites and the public would increase government blame. When elite corruption highlighted its consequences of taking opportunities away from ordinary people, we considered this corruption case as having an *explicit competition cue*. We manipulated this dimension of our experiment by either explicitly mentioning or not mentioning the consequence of corruption scandals. In the experimental design, participants were randomly assigned to either the *explicit* condition where the text included a sentence “In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected” or the *implicit* condition where the text did not include this sentence.

**Table S5**

*Content of experimental stimuli: Area of corruption and explicit competition cue*

Topic	Competition cue	
	Implicit	Explicit
College Admission	In October 2017, ten congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in <b>the admission process of universities</b> . It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were admitted to prestigious universities without going through the appropriate process.	In October 2017, ten congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in <b>the admission process of universities</b> . It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were admitted to prestigious universities without going through the appropriate process. <b>In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.</b>
Preferential Hiring	In October 2017, ten congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in <b>the employment process of companies</b> . It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were employed at large companies without going through the appropriate process.	In October 2017, ten congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in <b>the employment process of companies</b> . It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were employed at large companies without going through the appropriate process. <b>In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.</b>
Elderly Care	In October 2017, ten congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in <b>the selection process for beneficiaries of a new national elderly care center</b> . It was found that elderly parents of politicians	In October 2017, ten congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in <b>the selection process for beneficiaries of a new national elderly care center</b> . It was found that elderly parents of politicians

and high government officials were admitted to the institute without going through the appropriate process.

and high government officials were admitted to the institute without going through the appropriate process. **In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.**

*Note.* None of the text was bolded in the actual study.

We expected that an explicit mention of opportunity loss due to elite corruption would trigger greater blame on the government, compared to when such consequence was implicit. However, the extents to which explicit and implicit opportunity loss increases government blame were not statistically different in all areas of corruption as shown in Table S6 and Figure S5. Thus, we decided to collapse the implicit and explicit conditions, and focused on the treatment effects by corruption topics in the main text of the paper.

**Table S6**


Average government-self blame by experimental conditions: By topic and competition cue

Topic	Competition Cue		Difference (t-statistic)
	Implicit	Explicit	
College admission	0.65	0.64	-0.41, $p = .68$
Preferential hiring	0.61	0.64	1.47, $p = .14$
Elderly care	0.66	0.62	-1.65, $p = .10$

*Note:* *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns (composite score of blame on education, employment, and retirement), ranging from 1 (greater government-blame) to 0 (greater self-blame).

**Figure S5**

*Effects of explicit competition cue on government-self blame by topic*



*Note:* Mean and 95% confidence interval of government-self blame by experimental conditions. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 1 (greater government-blame) to 0 (greater self-blame).

We propose two conjectures about the reasons behind this null finding. First, the treatment we devised to manipulate the explicitness of competition and unequal opportunities might have been too weak. We simply inserted a sentence that says “As a consequence, many applicants to

[college admissions / corporate employment / elderly care benefits] who met criteria were rejected,” which could have been too weak as an intervention to explicitly highlight the potential personal consequences. Another possibility is that people who were not given this extra sentence (the implicit condition) might have still inferred the opportunity loss caused by this corruption, thus ultimately having similar reactions with people assigned to the explicit condition. A second conjecture is that the explicitness or salience of opportunity loss is not a strong factor in how corruption scandals affect blame perceptions. It may be the case that regardless of whether corruption scandals result in the loss of opportunity for ordinary people, people may still come to blame the government to a greater extent after learning about elite corruption. Future research is needed to understand the role of explicit competition or loss of opportunity more clearly.

## 2) Distribution of Demographics across Experimental Conditions

**Table S7**

*Distribution of demographics by experimental conditions (%)*

	Experimental Conditions							Total (%)
	Baseline	Education + Explicit	Education + Implicit	Employment + Explicit	Employment + Implicit	Retirement + Explicit	Retirement + Implicit	
<b>Age</b>								
20-29	26	21	27	22	18	18	26	23
30-39	20	22	24	26	25	25	21	23
40-49	27	28	27	21	28	33	26	27
50-59	27	28	23	31	29	25	27	27
<b>Gender</b>								
Female	48	55	52	50	49	56	52	52
Male	52	45	48	50	51	44	48	48
<b>Education</b>								
No college	22	21	22	19	22	21	23	21.5
College	78	79	78	81	78	79	77	78.5
<b>Ideology</b>								
Conservative	22	25	19	24	18	20	23	22
Moderate	35	30	37	34	39	34	41	36
Liberal	43	45	43	42	43	46	36	42
<b>Partisan Identity</b>								
Incumbent	49	55	54	42	46	48	51	49
Opposition	27	24	21	31	28	26	23	26
Independent	24	21	24	26	26	26	26	25
<b>N</b>	170	166	166	172	168	167	176	1,185

**Table S8**

*Distribution of partisan identity and ideology by strength (%)*

Partisan Identity	Weak (%)	Strong (%)	N
<b>Incumbent Partisans</b>			
Democratic Party of Korea	32	68	585 (49%)

<b>Opposition Partisans (combined)</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>305 (26%)</b>
Liberty Korea Party	34	66	113
Justice Party	37	63	123
Bareun Party	46	54	65
Party for Democracy and Peace	50	50	4
Other			5

**Independent** **290 (24%)**

<b>Ideology</b>	Slightly (%)	Moderately (%)	Very (%)	
Liberal	65	30	5	505 (43%)
Conservative	72	23	5	256 (22%)
Moderate				424 (36%)
<b>Total</b>				<b>1185</b>

*Note:* Using the two-step questions on partisan identity, the respondents who indicated “yes” to the first question “Is there a political party that you usually think of yourself as a supporter of the party?” were identified as strong partisans to the party that they chose in the subsequent question. The respondents who indicated “No” or “Don’t know” to the first question but chose “yes” to the next question “Even so, is there a party that you support relatively more than other parties?” were identified as weak partisans to the party they chose in the following question.

### 3) Recruitment Process

To collect a sample that is diverse in terms of gender, age, and region, the survey firm, Macromill Embrain, used the quota sampling on the basis of population distributions in South Korea as shown in Table S9. The survey firm used their prescreening data on gender, age, and region in the recruitment. While this quota table is designed for 1,029 respondents, in the process of actual recruitment, the survey firm recruited a few additional respondents, resulting in the final sample of 1,185 respondents. The cost of recruitment was 2,700 Korean won (approx. \$2.48 USD as of November 21, 2018) per respondent.

**Table S9**

*Sampling quota for region, gender, and age (%)*

<b>Region</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age</b>				<b>Total</b>
		20~29	30~39	40~49	50~59	
Seoul	Male	24	26	26	25	204
	Female	24	26	27	26	
Busan	Male	8	8	9	9	67
	Female	7	7	9	10	
Daegu	Male	6	5	7	7	49
	Female	5	5	7	7	
Incheon	Male	7	7	8	8	59
	Female	6	7	8	8	
Gwangju	Male	4	3	4	4	29
	Female	3	3	4	4	
Daejeon	Male	4	4	4	4	30
	Female	3	3	4	4	

Ulsan	Male	3	3	3	4	24
	Female	2	3	3	3	
Sejong	Male	1	1	1	1	8
	Female	1	1	1	1	
Gyeonggi-do	Male	30	33	38	35	265
	Female	27	31	37	34	
Gangwon-do	Male	3	3	4	5	29
	Female	3	3	4	4	
Chungcheongbuk-do	Male	4	4	4	5	31
	Female	3	3	4	4	
Chungcheongnam-do	Male	4	5	6	6	39
	Female	4	4	5	5	
Jeollabuk-do	Male	4	4	5	5	34
	Female	3	3	5	5	
Jeollanam-do	Male	4	4	5	6	34
	Female	3	3	4	5	
Gyeongsangbuk-do	Male	6	6	7	8	49
	Female	4	5	6	7	
Gyeongsangnam-do	Male	7	8	10	10	66
	Female	6	7	9	9	
Jeju Special Self-Governing Province	Male	1	1	2	2	12
	Female	1	1	2	2	
Total	Male	120	125	143	144	1,029
	Female	105	115	139	138	

*Note:* This quota table served as the survey firm’s target, which slightly diverged from the actual distribution in the sample in Table S7.

#### 4) Manipulation Check

At the end of the survey, the following question was asked to assess how well the key differences across experimental conditions were perceived by the respondents: “Which of the following was mentioned in the news story that you read in this survey?”

- Corporate employment (1)
- College admission (2)
- Beneficiaries for elderly care (3)
- None of the above (4)

Only the respondents who were assigned to one of the treatment conditions, thus had seen a corruption scandal story, were given this manipulation check question. Following Hauser, Ellsworth, & Gonzalez (2018)’s recommendation, we placed this question at the very end of the survey in order to prevent any unintended influence of this question on outcomes. We did not drop respondents who failed the manipulation check because excluding respondents who failed the manipulation check can result in biased results as suggested by Aronow, Baron, & Pinson (2019).

**Table S10***Responses to manipulation check by experimental conditions*

	Treatment Conditions			Total
	College admission corruption	Preferential hiring corruption	Elderly care corruption	
College admission	<b>65.2</b>	3.2	4.4	23.8
Corporate employment	33.8	<b>94.6</b>	18.4	48.7
Beneficiaries for elderly care	1.0	2.2	<b>77.3</b>	27.5
None	0	0	0	0
N	305	312	321	938

Note: Entries are the percentage of each response per experimental condition.

As shown in Table S10, responses across different conditions indicate that the key experimental manipulation—the area of corruption scandal—in this study was effective. In all treatment conditions, a majority of responses were consistent with the intention of the study design. In the condition with college admissions corruption, 65.2% of the respondents said they were given a story about college admissions. In the condition where respondents were given a preferential hiring corruption story, 94.6% of respondents recalled that they were given a story about corporate employment. Among respondents assigned to the condition with an elderly care corruption story, 77.3% recalled that they were given a story about beneficiaries for elderly care. None of the respondents who were assigned to the treatment conditions chose ‘none of the above’ for this question.

### Main Findings in Tabular Form

#### 1) Corruption Scandal Effects on Overall Blame

**Table S11***Corruption scandal effects on blame: All respondents and by degree of anxiety*

	Government-Self Blame		
	All Respondents	More Worried	Less Worried
College admission	0.041** (0.018)	0.066*** (0.022)	0.008 (0.028)
Preferential Hiring	0.023 (0.018)	0.057** (0.024)	-0.007 (0.027)
Elderly care	0.032* (0.018)	0.043* (0.024)	0.020 (0.027)
Constant	0.607*** (0.015)	0.625*** (0.019)	0.582*** (0.023)
N	1,185	658	527

Note: Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *College admission* = 1 if college admission corruption, 0 otherwise; *Preferential Hiring* = 1 if Preferential hiring corruption =, 0 otherwise; *Elderly care* = 1 if elderly care corruption =, 0 otherwise. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 1 (greater government-blame) to 0 (greater self-blame). \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

## 2) Corruption Scandal Effects on Topic-specific Blame

**Table S12**

*Corruption scandal effects on topic-specific blame: All respondents*

	Education Blame	Employment Blame	Retirement Blame
College admission	0.08*** (0.02)	0.03 <sup>†</sup> (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Preferential hiring	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Elderly care	0.05** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Constant	0.60*** (0.02)	0.60*** (0.02)	0.63*** (0.02)
N	1,185	1,185	1,185

*Note:* Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. [*Education / Employment / Retirement*] *Blame* refers to the degree to which individuals blame the government as the cause of personal concerns on [*education / employment / retirement*], where higher value indicates blaming the government more and lower value indicates blaming oneself more (coded to range from 0 to 1). \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ . <sup>†</sup> $p = .109$ .

**Table S13**

*Corruption scandal effects on topic-specific blame: By degree of anxiety*

	Education Blame		Employment Blame		Retirement Blame	
	More worried	Less worried	More worried	Less worried	More worried	Less worried
College admission	0.12*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06** (0.03)	0.002 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Preferential hiring	0.08*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Elderly care	0.09*** (0.03)	0.001 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Constant	0.60*** (0.02)	0.59*** (0.03)	0.60*** (0.02)	0.59*** (0.03)	0.67*** (0.02)	0.57*** (0.03)
N	658	527	658	527	658	527

*Note:* Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. [*Education / Employment / Retirement*] *Blame* refers to the degree to which individuals blame the government as the cause of personal concerns on [*education / employment / retirement*], where higher value indicates blaming the government more and lower value indicates blaming oneself more (coded to range from 0 to 1). \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

## 3) Corruption Effects by Ideology and Partisanship

**Table S14**

*Corruption scandal effects on government-self blame: By ideology and partisanship*

	Government-Self Blame			
	Liberals	Conservatives	Incumbent Partisans	Opposition Partisans

College admission	0.043* (0.026)	0.008 (0.038)	0.049** (0.025)	0.041 (0.031)
Preferential hiring	0.014 (0.027)	0.012 (0.038)	0.034 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.032)
Elderly care	0.048* (0.026)	0.002 (0.039)	0.042 (0.025)	0.013 (0.031)
Constant	0.605*** (0.022)	0.642*** (0.031)	0.601*** (0.021)	0.639*** (0.024)
<i>N</i>	505	256	585	305

*Note:* Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *College admission* = 1 if college admission corruption =, 0 otherwise; *Preferential hiring* = 1 if Preferential hiring corruption, 0 otherwise; *Elderly care* = 1 if elderly care corruption, 0 otherwise. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 1 (government-blame) to 0 (self-blame). *Incumbent Partisans* refer to partisans who identify with Democratic Party of Korea (DPK). *Opposition Partisans* refer to partisans who identify parties other than DPK. \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S15**

*Corruption scandal effects on government-self blame among moderates, pure independents, and partisans of major opposition party*

	<i>Government-Self Blame</i>		
	Moderates (Ideology)	(Pure) Independents	Major Opposition Partisans
College admission	0.06* (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.021 (0.051)
Preferential hiring	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.009 (0.055)
Elderly care	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.052)
Constant	0.59*** (0.03)	0.58*** (0.03)	0.679*** (0.040)
<i>N</i>	424	290	113

*Note:* Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *College admission* = 1 if college admission corruption =, 0 otherwise; *Preferential hiring* = 1 if Preferential hiring corruption, 0 otherwise; *Elderly care* = 1 if elderly care corruption, 0 otherwise. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 1 (government-blame) to 0 (self-blame). *Major Opposition Partisans* refer to partisans who identify with the major opposition party, Liberal Korea Party (LKP). \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .


## Additional Analyses

### 1) Alternative Median Split of the Degree of Anxiety

To analyze how anxiety moderate the effects of corruption scandals, we used the median split approach (Iacobucci et al., 2015). The median level of anxiety about personal concerns was the 0.6667, indicated as the vertical line shown in Figure S2, which included 170 respondents.

**Figure S6**

The distribution of anxiety (horizontal axis, ranging from 0 to 1) and the median level of anxiety (vertical line)



There are two choices to create binary groups on the basis of this median: include individuals with the median level of anxiety in either higher-concern group or lower-concern group. When we take the first approach, there are 658 more worried and 527 less worried individuals. With the second approach, there are 488 more worried and 697 less worried individuals. In the main text of the paper, we present the results based on the first approach, because 1) the number of respondents is relatively more even across the two groups, and 2) the median is closer to the higher end of the anxiety scale, so the substantive meaning of median level anxiety is relatively higher anxiety.

To confirm that our substantive findings are robust to the alternative way of median-split categorization, we present the results based on the second approach in Table S16. The statistical significance and direction of treatment effects, and substantive findings stay the same, reinforcing the robustness of our findings on how anxiety moderate the effects of corruption scandals on blame attribution.

**Table S16**


Treatment effects of corruption scandal stories on government-self blame by anxiety levels (Alternative median split)

	Government-Self Blame	
	More worried	Less worried
College admission	0.08*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Preferential hiring	0.08*** (0.03)	-0.003 (0.02)
Elderly care	0.05* (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Constant	0.62*** (0.02)	0.60*** (0.02)
N	488	697

Note: Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Figure S7**

*Corruption scandal effects on government-self blame by anxiety levels (Alternative median split)*



*Note:* Mean and 95% confidence interval of government-self blame attribution by experimental conditions.

## 2) Analysis of Treatment Effects with Demographic Controls

As shown in Table S17, the direction and statistical significance of corruption scandal effects remained the same with the main results, even after controlling for gender, age, education, and income.

**Table S17**

*Corruption scandal effects on blame attribution with demographic controls*

	<i>Government-Self Blame</i>		
	All Respondents	More Worried	Less Worried
College admission	0.05** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Preferential hiring	0.03 (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	-0.005 (0.03)
Elderly care	0.04** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Female	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Age	-0.002*** (0.0005)	-0.001 (0.0007)	-0.003*** (0.001)
College	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03* (0.001)
Income	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.0005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Constant	0.69*** (0.03)	0.65*** (0.04)	0.67*** (0.04)
<i>N</i>	1,147	631	516

*Note:* Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *College admission* = 1 if college admission corruption, 0 otherwise; *Preferential hiring* = 1 if Preferential hiring corruption =, 0 otherwise; *Elderly care* = 1 if elderly care corruption =, 0 otherwise. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 1 (greater government-blame) to 0 (greater self-blame). *Female* = 1 if female, 0 if male; *Age* indicates the respondent's age (range from 20 to 59); *College* = 1 if college graduates, 0 if no college degree. *Income* indicates monthly income on an 11-point scale (1 = monthly income < 1,000,000 won (approx. \$1k) ~ 11 = monthly income > 10,000,000 won (approx. \$10k); \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ ).

In Table S18, we additionally confirmed that the degree of anxiety about personal concerns was not strongly correlated with any of the political predispositions or demographic variables. Overall, these correlations were relatively weak (< .20), suggesting anxiety and other variables were distinguishable constructs (discriminant validity is indicated by weaker coefficients (e.g., < .20), Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). This result indicates that the degree of anxiety was not simply a variable that replicates variations in other demographic or political characteristics, rendering more confidence in the unique role of anxiety in this study.

**Table S18**

*Correlations among anxiety, political predispositions, and demographic variables*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>1 Anxiety</b>	1						
2 Ideology	-.05	1					
3 Incumbent Partisan	-.02	.30***	1				
4 Female	.01	-.01	.07	1			
5 Age	-.15***	-.05	-.17***	.00	1		
6 College	-.02	.01	.02	-.07**	.07**	1	
7 Income	-.18***	-.07**	-.07*	.03	.03	.14***	1

*Note:* Entries are bivariate correlations among anxiety, political predispositions, and demographic variables. *Anxiety* indicates the degree of worry about personal grievances on on education, employment, and retirement, coded to range from 0 to 1. *Ideology* indicates conservative-liberal ideology (1=very conservative ~ 7=very liberal); *Incumbent Partisan* = 1 if incumbent partisan, 0 if partisans who support non-incumbent parties; *Female* = 1 if female, 0 if male; *Age* indicates the respondent's age (range from 20 to 59); *College* = 1 if college graduates, 0 if no college degree; *Income* indicates monthly income on an 11-point scale (1 = monthly income < 1,000,000 won (approx. \$1k) ~ 11 = monthly income > 10,000,000 won (approx. \$10k); \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ ).

### 3) Exploring Moderating Roles of Demographic Variables

We additionally explored whether demographic variables (gender, age, education, education, and income) may moderate the magnitude of treatment effects in Table S19. In Models 1 and 2, we interact each corruption treatment—"Admission" (college admission), "Hiring" (preferential hiring), "Elderly" (Elderly care)—with binary indicators of gender ("Female") and education ("College"). In Models 3 and 4, following Hainmueller et al. (2018), we interact each corruption treatment—"Admission" (college admission), "Hiring" (preferential hiring), "Elderly" (Elderly care)—with tercile indicators for age and income.

We found little evidence that the effects of corruption story treatments were moderated by age, education, or income. Consistent with prior findings that females tend to be more punitive to corruption (Alexander et al., 2020), female respondents blamed the government to a greater extent than male respondents upon learning about corruption on college admission, but such moderating relationship was not found for corruption on preferential hiring or elderly care.

**Table S19**

*Corruption scandal effects on blame attribution: By demographic traits*

	<i>Government-Self Blame</i>				
	Model 1 (gender)	Model 2 (age)	Model 3 (education)	Model 4 (income)	
Admission	0.01 (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)	Admission	0.05 (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)
Hiring	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	Hiring	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)
Elderly	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	Elderly	0.07* (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Female	-0.03 (0.03)		College	0.04 (0.03)	
Admission x Female	0.07** (0.04)		Admission x College	-0.01 (0.04)	
Hiring x Female	0.06 (0.04)		Hiring x College	-0.04 (0.04)	
Elderly x Female	0.05 (0.04)		Elderly x College	-0.05 (0.04)	
Age_cat		-0.04 (0.03)	Income_cat		-0.01 (0.04)
Admission x Age_cat		-0.01 (0.04)	Admission x Income_cat		-0.01 (0.04)
Hiring x Age_cat		-0.01 (0.04)	Hiring x Income_cat		0.01 (0.04)
Elderly x Age_cat		-0.01 (0.04)	Elderly x Income_cat		0.02 (0.04)
Constant	0.62*** (0.02)	0.63*** (0.02)	Constant	0.58*** (0.03)	0.61*** (0.03)
<i>N</i>	1185	1185	<i>N</i>	1185	1147

*Note:* Entries are the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *Admission* = 1 if college admission corruption, 0 otherwise; *Hiring* = 1 if preferential hiring corruption =, 0 otherwise; *Elderly* = 1 if elderly care corruption =, 0 otherwise. *Government-Self Blame* refers to the degree of blaming the government or oneself as the cause of personal concerns, ranging from 1 (greater government-blame) to 0 (greater self-blame). *Female* = 1 if female, 0 if male; *Age\_cat* = 1 if median age or older (41-59), 0 if younger than median age (20-40); *College* = 1 if college graduates, 0 if no college degree; *Income\_cat* = 1 if monthly income is equal to or greater than median income (4,000,000 won, approx. \$4k), 0 if monthly income is less than median income. \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

## Survey Questionnaire

The study materials, data, and codes will be made available at an OSF repository upon the publication of this paper.

### 1) English (Translated)

#### 1. Pre-treatment Questions

**[Age]** When is your birth year? \_\_\_\_\_

**[Gender]** What is your gender?

- Male (1)
- Female (2)

**[Region]** In which province do you currently reside?

- Seoul (1)
- Busan (2)
- Daegu (3)
- Incheon (4)
- Gwangju (5)
- Daejun (6)
- Ulsan (7)
- Sejong (8)
- Gyeonggi-do (9)
- Gangwon-do (10)
- Chunchungbuk-do (11)
- Chungchungnam-do (12)
- Jeonlabuk-do (13)
- Jeonlanam-do (14)
- Gyeongsangbuk-do (15)
- Gyeongsannam-do (16)
- Jeju-do (17)

**[Spouse]** What is your marital status?

- Never married (1)
- Married (Have a spouse) (2)
- Divorced (3)
- Widowed (4)
- Separated (5)
- Other \_\_\_\_\_ (6)

**[Children]** Do you have a child (children)?

- Yes [Number of children: \_\_\_\_\_] (1)
- No (2)

**[Parent]** When is the birth year of your parent and are your parent alive?

1. Father	Birth year _____	Alive (1) Dead (2) Other (Describe: _____) (3)
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2. Mother	Birth year _____	Alive (1) Dead (2) Other (Describe: _____) (3)
-----------	------------------	--

**[Partisan Identity] PID1.** Is there a political party that you usually think of yourself as a supporter of the party?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)
- Don't know (3)

[display if PID1==1] **PID2.** If so, which party do you support?

- Democratic Party of Korea (1)
- Liberty Korea Party (2)
- Justice Party (3)
- Bareun Party (4)
- Party for Democracy and Peace (5)
- Other (6) \_\_\_\_\_

[display if PID1 == 2 | 3] **PID3.** Even so, is there a party that you support relatively more than other parties?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

[display if PID3 == 1] **PID3.** If so, which party do you support relatively more than other parties?

- Democratic Party of Korea (1)
- Liberty Korea Party (2)
- Justice Party (3)
- Bareun Party (4)
- Party for Democracy and Peace (5)
- Other (6) \_\_\_\_\_

**[Ideology]** People usually distinguish liberalism and conservatism. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- Very conservative (1)
- Conservative (2)
- Slightly Conservative (3)
- Middle (4)
- Slightly Liberal (5)
- Liberal (6)
- Very liberal (7)

**[Anxiety]** The tables below present a list of problems that many people these days experience in their personal lives. Among **[employment, education, retirement]**, what is the concern that you have about yourself or your family members? For each category, how much are you worried about yourself and your family members?

<b>Employment</b>	Extremely worried (1)	Very worried (2)	Moderately worried (3)	A little worried (4)	Not at all worried (5)
Yourself (1)					
Your spouse (2)					
Your children (3)					

Your parents (4)					
<b>Education</b>	Extremely worried (1)	Very worried (2)	Moderately worried (3)	A little worried (4)	Not at all worried (5)
Yourself (1)					
Your spouse (2)					
Your children (3)					
Your parents (4)					

<b>Retirement/Aging</b>	Extremely worried (1)	Very worried (2)	Moderately worried (3)	A little worried (4)	Not at all worried (5)
Yourself (1)					
Your spouse (2)					
Your children (3)					
Your parents (4)					

\* Display “your spouse,” “your children,” “your parent” items if the respondent indicated earlier in the survey that they have each member in their family.

**[Open-ended Employment Concerns].** Regarding **Employment**, please elaborate on the worries you have about yourself or your family member.

\* Skip if ‘not at all’ to all four categories on employment

**[Open-ended Employment Concerns].** Regarding **Education**, please elaborate on the worries you have about yourself or your family member.

\* Skip if ‘not at all’ to all four categories on education

**[Open-ended Retirement Concerns].** Regarding **Retirement/Aging**, please elaborate on the worries you have about yourself or your family member.

\* Skip if ‘not at all’ to all four categories on retirement

## 2. Experimental Treatment

**[Instruction]** The following story is about one of the topics that have been in the news recently. Before moving on to the next questions, please take a moment to read the story. We will ask you some questions about your thoughts about what was discussed in the story.

*Note:* Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 7 conditions.

### **Condition=1. Control group**

[No vignette is provided]

### **Condition =2. College admission x Implicit competition cue:**

In October 2017, ten congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in *the admission process of universities*. It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were admitted to prestigious universities without going through the appropriate process.

**Condition ==3. College admission x Explicit competition cue:**

In October 2017, ten congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in *the admission process of universities*. It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were admitted to prestigious universities without going through the appropriate process. In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.

**Condition ==4. Preferential hiring x Implicit competition cue:**

In October 2017, ten congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in *the employment process of companies*. It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were employed at large companies without going through the appropriate process.

**Condition ==5. Preferential hiring x Explicit competition cue:**

In October 2017, ten congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in *the employment process of companies*. It was found that children of politicians and high government officials were employed at large companies without going through the appropriate process. In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.

**Condition ==6. Elderly care x Implicit competition cue:**

In October 2017, ten congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in *the selection process for beneficiaries of a new national elderly care center*. It was found that elderly parents of politicians and high government officials were admitted to the institute without going through the appropriate process.

**Condition ==7. Elderly care x Explicit competition cue:**

In October 2017, ten congressmen were implicated in a corruption scandal. It was revealed that, by using government power, they intervened in *the selection process for beneficiaries of a new national elderly care center*. It was found that elderly parents of politicians and high government officials were admitted to the institute without going through the appropriate process. In consequence, many applicants who met admission criteria were rejected.

**3. Post-treatment Question**

**[Government-Self Blame for Personal Concerns]** As the cause of your personal concerns about yourself or your family members, between the government and yourself, which do you think is more responsible?

In the answer choices, “government” broadly refers to politicians, central and local governments, government’s relationship with Cheobol system, and government’s management of economy. “Myself” broadly refers to your educational background, your family’s financial condition, the degree of your ambition and effort, and your personal choices.

	Government is completely responsible [1]	Government is somewhat responsible [2]	Equally responsible [3]	I myself is somewhat responsible [4]	I myself is completely responsible [5]
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Employment (1)					
Education (2)					
Retirement/Aging (3)					

#### 4. End of the survey

**[Income]** Could you give us an estimate of your family's monthly income? This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest and all other income for every member of your family living in your house.

- Less than 1,000,000 won [1]
- 1,000,000 ~ 1,990,000 won [2]
- 2,000,000 ~ 2,990,000 won [3]
- 3,000,000 ~ 3,990,000 won [4]
- 4,000,000 ~ 4,990,000 won [5]
- 5,000,000 ~ 5,990,000 won [6]
- 6,000,000 ~ 6,990,000 won [7]
- 7,000,000 ~ 7,990,000 won [8]
- 8,000,000 ~ 8,990,000 won [9]
- 9,000,000 ~ 9,990,000 won [10]
- Greater than 10,000,000 won [11]
- Don't know [11]

**[Education]** What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- No education (1)
- Graduated elementary school (2)
- Graduate middle school (3)
- Graduated high school (4)
- Bachelor's degree in college (2-year or 4-year college) (5)
- Graduate degree (Master's or Doctoral) (6)
- Other, please explain: (7) \_\_\_\_\_

**[Personal Corruption Experience]** Here is a list of items some people experience. In your life, have you personally experienced any of these?

	Yes (1)	No (2)
A police officer asked you, personally, to pay a bribe (1)		
A public official asked you, personally, to pay a bribe (2)		
You, personally, were asked to pay a bribe at work (3)		
You, personally, were asked to pay a bribe in the school system (4)		
You, personally, were asked to pay a bribe at a hospital or a doctor's office (5)		

[Display if condition != 1] **[Manipulation check]** Which of the following was mentioned in the news story that you read in this survey?

- Corporate employment (1)
- College admission (2)
- Beneficiaries for elderly care (3)
- None of the above (4)

## 2) Korean (Original)

### 1. 실험문항 이전

[나이] 귀하의 출생연도는 어떻게 되십니까? \_\_\_\_\_

[성별] 귀하의 성별은 어떻게 되십니까?

- 1) 남성
- 2) 여성

[지역] 다음 중 귀하의 거주지(주민등록주소지 기준)는 어디입니까?

- 1) 서울특별시
- 2) 부산광역시
- 3) 대구광역시
- 4) 인천광역시
- 5) 광주광역시
- 6) 대전광역시
- 7) 울산광역시
- 8) 세종특별자치시
- 9) 경기도
- 10) 강원도
- 11) 충청북도
- 12) 충청남도
- 13) 전라북도
- 14) 전라남도
- 15) 경상북도
- 16) 경상남도
- 17) 제주특별자치도

[배우자] 귀하의 혼인상태는 어떻게 되십니까?

- 1) 미혼
- 2) 기혼 (배우자 있음)
- 3) 이혼
- 4) 사별
- 5) 별거
- 6) 기타 (직접 작성:\_\_\_\_\_)

[자녀] 자녀유무를 선택해 주세요.

- 1) 있음 ( ) 명
- 2) 없음

**[부모님]** 귀하의 부모님의 출생연도 및 생존해 계신지 여부는 어떻게 되십니까?

1. 아버지	_____년생	1) 생존 2) 사망 3) 기타 (직접 작성: _____)
2. 어머니	_____년생	1) 생존 2) 사망 3) 기타 (직접 작성: _____)

**[정당일체감] PID1.** 평소 지지하는 정당이 있다고 생각하십니까?

- 1) 그렇다
- 2) 아니다
- 3) 모르겠다

[PID1==1] **PID2.** 그렇다면, 어느 정당을 지지하십니까?

- 1) 더불어민주당
- 2) 자유한국당
- 3) 정의당
- 4) 바른미래당
- 5) 민주평화당
- 6) 기타 \_\_\_\_\_

[PID1==2|3] **PID3.** 그렇지 않다면, 다른 정당보다 비교적 더 지지한다고 생각하는 정당이 있습니까?

- 1) 그렇다 [Q7으로]
- 2) 아니다 [Q8로]

[PID3==1] **PID4.** 그렇다면, 다른 정당보다 더 지지한다고 생각하는 정당은 어디입니까?

- 1) 더불어민주당
- 2) 자유한국당
- 3) 정의당
- 4) 바른미래당
- 5) 민주평화당
- 6) 기타 \_\_\_\_\_

**[정치이념]** 정치에서 사람들은 보통 진보와 보수를 구분합니다. 귀하께서는 귀하 자신이 어디에 속한다고 생각하십니까?

매우 보수적	보수적	약간 보수적	중도	약간 진보적	진보적	매우 진보적
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

**[개인적 걱정]** 아래의 표에는 최근 많은 사람들이 개인적인 삶에서 겪고 있는 문제들의 목록이 제시되어 있습니다. 다음 목록 **[취업/고용, 교육, 은퇴/고령화]** 중 귀하가 본인 또는 가족구성원 (배우자, 자녀, 부모님 등)에 관하여 최근 갖고 있는 걱정거리는 무엇입니까? 각 항목마다 귀하가 본인과 가족구성원에 대하여 걱정하는 정도는 어떻게 되십니까?

취업/고용	매우 걱정한다 (1)	걱정하는 편이다 (2)	보통이다 (3)	걱정하지 않는 편이다 (4)	전혀 걱정하지 않는다 (5)
본인 (1)					
배우자 (2)					
자녀 (3)					
부모님 (4)					

교육	매우 걱정한다 (1)	걱정하는 편이다 (2)	보통이다 (3)	걱정하지 않는 편이다 (4)	전혀 걱정하지 않는다 (5)
본인 (1)					
배우자 (2)					
자녀 (3)					
부모님 (4)					

은퇴/고령화	매우 걱정한다 (1)	걱정하는 편이다 (2)	보통이다 (3)	걱정하지 않는 편이다 (4)	전혀 걱정하지 않는다 (5)
본인 (1)					
배우자 (2)					
자녀 (3)					
부모님 (4)					

(\* 배우자, 자녀, 부모님 항목은 설문 초반 관련 문항에 대한 응답에 따라 해당 가족 구성원이 있는 경우에만 활성화)

**[개인적 걱정: 취업/고용]** 취업/고용과 관련하여, 본인 또는 귀하의 가족구성원에 관하여 갖고 있는 걱정거리가 무엇인지 구체적으로 적어주세요. \_\_\_\_\_

(\* 취업/고용 항목에 모든 구성원에 5. 전혀 아님을 응답할 시 SKIP)

**[개인적 걱정: 교육]** 교육과 관련하여, 본인 또는 귀하의 가족구성원에 관하여 갖고 있는 걱정거리가 무엇인지 구체적으로 적어주세요. \_\_\_\_\_

(\* 교육 항목에 모든 구성원에 5. 전혀 아님을 응답할 시 SKIP)

**[개인적 걱정: 은퇴/고령화]** 은퇴/고령화와 관련하여, 본인 또는 귀하의 가족구성원에 관하여 갖고 있는 걱정거리가 무엇인지 구체적으로 적어주세요. \_\_\_\_\_

(\* 은퇴/고령화 항목에 모든 구성원에 5. 전혀 아님을 응답할 시 SKIP)

## 2. 실험문항

다음의 글은 최근 뉴스에서 다루어진 주제 중 하나에 관한 글입니다. 다음 문항으로 넘어가기 전에, 이 글을 읽어주시기 바랍니다. 해당 사건에 관하여 귀하께서 어떠한 생각을 갖고 계신지 여쭙는 문항이 주어질 예정입니다.

[각 응답자에게 일곱 가지 조건 중 하나가 무작위로 제시 됨]

### 1. Control group (통제군)

[아무런 글도 제공되지 않음]

### 2. College admission x Explicit competition cue

지난 2017년 10월, 국회의원 10명이 부패 스캔들에 연루되었음이 밝혀진 사건이 있었습니다. 이들은 정부 권력을 이용하여 *대학 입시*에 관여한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이 사건에서 정치인과 고위 공직자의 자녀들이 정당한 절차를 거치지 않고 일류 대학에 입학하였음이 밝혀졌습니다.

### 3. College admission x Explicit competition cue

지난 2017년 10월, 국회의원 10명이 부패 스캔들에 연루되었음이 밝혀진 사건이 있었습니다. 이들은 정부 권력을 이용하여 *대학 입시*에 관여한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이 사건에서 정치인과 고위 공직자의 자녀들이 정당한 절차를 거치지 않고 일류 대학에 입학하였음이 밝혀졌습니다. 이로 인하여, 입학 자격을 충족했던 수많은 지원자들이 대학 입시에서 불합격 통보를 받은 것으로 드러났습니다.

### 4. Preferential hiring x Implicit competition cue

지난 2017년 10월, 국회의원 10명이 부패 스캔들에 연루되었음이 밝혀진 사건이 있었습니다. 이들은 정부 권력을 이용하여 *기업들의 채용 과정*에 관여한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이 사건에서 정치인과 고위 공직자의 자녀들이 정당한 절차를 거치지 않고 대기업에 취직하였음이 밝혀졌습니다.

### 5. Preferential hiring x Explicit competition cue

지난 2017년 10월, 국회의원 10명이 부패 스캔들에 연루되었음이 밝혀진 사건이 있었습니다. 이들은 정부 권력을 이용하여 *기업들의 채용 과정*에 관여한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이 사건에서 정치인과 고위 공직자의 자녀들이 정당한 절차를 거치지 않고 대기업에 취직하였음이 밝혀졌습니다. 이로 인하여, 취업 자격을 충족했던 수많은 지원자들이 채용시험에서 불합격 통보를 받은 것으로 드러났습니다.

### 6. Elderly care x Implicit competition cue

지난 2017년 10월, 국회의원 10명이 부패 스캔들에 연루되었음이 밝혀진 사건이 있었습니다. 이들은 정부 권력을 이용하여 *국립 양로원 수혜자 선정 과정*에 관여한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이 사건에서 정치인과 고위 공직자의 노부모들이 정당한 절차를 거치지 않고 수혜자로 선정되었음이 밝혀졌습니다.

### 7. Elderly care x Explicit competition cue

지난 2017년 10월, 국회의원 10명이 부패 스캔들에 연루되었음이 밝혀진 사건이 있었습니다. 이들은 정부 권력을 이용하여 *국립 양로원 수혜자 선정 과정*에 관여한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이 사건에서 정치인과 고위 공직자의 노부모들이 정당한 절차를 거치지 않고 수혜자로 선정되었음이 밝혀졌습니다. 이로 인하여, 수혜자 자격을 충족했던 수많은 지원자들이 수혜 대상자 선발 과정에서 불합격 통보를 받은 것으로 드러났습니다.

### 3. 실험문항 이후

**[정부-본인 책임 평가]** 귀하가 본인 또는 가족구성원 (배우자, 자녀, 부모님 등)에 관하여 최근 갖고 있는 걱정거리의 원인으로, 정부와 귀하 자신 중 누구의 책임이 더 크다고 생각하십니까?

선택지 중 "정부 책임"에서 '정부'는 정치인, 중앙정부, 지방정부, 정부와 재벌 간의 관계, 정부의 경제 관리를 포괄적으로 의미하며. 선택지 중 "본인 책임"에서 '본인'은 귀하의 교육 배경, 가정의 경제적 여건, 개인적인 야망과 노력의 정도, 개인적 선택을 포괄적으로 의미합니다.

	완전히 정부 책임 (1)	대체로 정부 책임 (2)	동등한 책임 (3)	대체로 본인 책임 (4)	완전히 본인 책임 (5)
취업/고용 (1)					
교육 (2)					
은퇴/고령화 (3)					

### 4. 설문조사 마지막 부분

**[소득]** 귀하 닉의 한 달 가구소득은 얼마나 되나요? 가족 구성원 전체의 월급, 상여금, 은행이자 등을 모두 포함하여 개략적으로 말씀해 주세요.

- 1) 100 만원 미만
- 2) 100-199 만원
- 3) 200-299 만원
- 4) 300-399 만원
- 5) 400-499 만원
- 6) 500-599 만원
- 7) 600-699 만원
- 8) 700-799 만원
- 9) 800-899 만원
- 10) 900-999 만원
- 11) 1,000 만원 이상
- 12) 잘 모름

**[학력]** 학교를 어디까지 마치셨나요?

- 1) 무학
- 2) 초등(국민)학교 졸업
- 3) 중학교 졸업
- 4) 고등학교 졸업
- 5) 대학교 졸업(2~4 년제)
- 6) 대학원 졸업(석/박사)
- 7) 기타 \_\_\_\_\_

[부정부패 개인적 경험] 다음은 사람들이 겪을 수 있는 경험의 목록입니다. 귀하는 살아오면서 다음과 같은 사건을 경험한 적이 있습니까?

	예(1)	아니오(2)
경찰에게서 개인적으로 뇌물을 요구 받은 적이 있다. (1)		
공무원에게서 개인적으로 뇌물을 요구 받은 적이 있다. (2)		
직장에서 개인적으로 뇌물을 요구 받은 적이 있다. (3)		
학교에서 개인적으로 뇌물을 요구 받은 적이 있다. (4)		
병원에서 개인적으로 뇌물을 요구 받은 적이 있다. (5)		

[실험조작 점검; 통제군에게는 제시하지 않음] 설문조사 중반부에 보셨던 정치인 부패 스캔들에 관한 글은 다음 중 무엇과 가장 관련이 깊습니까?

- 1) 기업 채용
- 2) 대학 입시
- 3) 국립 요양원 수혜자 선정
- 4) 해당사항 없음

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